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Abstract—A social network confers benefits and advantages on indi-
viduals (and on groups); the literature refers to these benefits and ad-
vantages as social capital. An individual’s social capital depends on its
position in the network and on the shape of the network – but positions in
the network and the shape of the network are determined endogenously
and change as the network forms and evolves. This paper presents
a micro-founded mathematical model of the evolution of a social net-
work and of the social capital of individuals within the network. The
evolution of the network and of social capital are driven by exogenous
and endogenous processes – birth, meeting, linking – that have both
random and deterministic components. These processes are influenced
by the extent to which individuals are homophilic (prefer others of their
own type), structurally opportunistic (prefer neighbors of neighbors to
strangers), socially gregarious (desire more or fewer connections) and
by the distribution of types in the society. In the analysis, we identify
different kinds of social capital: bonding capital refers to links to others;
popularity capital refers to links from others; bridging capital refers to
connections between others. We show that each form of capital plays
a different role and is affected differently by the characteristics of the
society. Bonding capital is created by forming a circle of connections;
homophily increases bonding capital because it makes this circle of
connections more homogeneous. Popularity capital leads to preferential
attachment : individuals who become popular tend to become more and
more popular because others are more likely to link to them. Homophily
creates inequality in the popularity capital attained by different social
groups; more gregarious types of agents are more likely to become
popular. However, in homophilic societies, individuals who belong to
less gregarious, less opportunistic, or major types are likely to be more
central in the network and thus acquire a bridging capital. And, while
extreme homophily maximizes an individual’s bonding capital, it also
creates structural holes in the network, which hinder the exchange
of ideas and information across social groups. Such structural holes
represent a potential source of bridging capital: non-homophilic (tolerant
or open-minded) individuals can fill these holes and broker interactions
at the interface between different groups.
Index Terms—Centrality, homophily, network formation, popularity, pref-
erential attachment, social capital, social networks.
1 INTRODUCTION
SOCIAL networks bestow benefits – tangible benefitssuch as physical and monetary resources and intangible
benefits such as social support, solidarity, influence,
information, expertise, popularity, companionship and
shared activity – on the individuals and groups who belong
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to the network. Such resources allow individuals to do
better in the network; they help individuals accomplish
tasks, produce and spread information, broker interactions
across social groups, display influence on other individuals,
gain more knowledge, or enjoy more emotional and social
support. The concept of social capital has come to embody
a set of different incarnations of the benefits attained by
social groups via networked societal interactions [1]-[6].
Contemporary sociologists have established different
definitions and conceptualizations for social capital. For
instance, Coleman has defined the social capital as “a
function of social structure producing advantage” [1], and
he advanced social capital as a conceptual tool that puts
economic rationality into a social context [1][2]. Social
capital for Bourdieu is related to the size of network and
the volume of past accumulated social capital commanded
by an individual [3]. Bourdieu considers that clear profit
is the main reason for an individual to engage in and
maintain links in a network, and the individuals’ potential
for accruing social profit and control of capital are non-
uniformly distributed. Both conceptualizations of Coleman
and Bourdieu are related; they view social capital as
existing in relationships and ties, and they postulate that
density and closure are distinctive advantages of capital.
While such vision assumes that strong ties (the links
between homogeneous and like-minded individuals) are
the prominent sources of social capital, other sociologists
such as Granovetter, Putnam, and Burt have argued that
weak ties (the links between diverse and weakly connected
network components) are also a source of capital [6]-[9].
That is, individuals who can broker connections between
otherwise disconnected social groups are more likely
to connect non-redundant sources of information, thus
promoting for innovation and new ideas [8]. In [8], Burt
provided a generalized framework for social capital,
viewing bonding capital in connected communities as a
source for bridging capital for individuals who connect
these communities.
As it is for other forms of capital, inequality is displayed
in the creation of social capital [10]; that is to say, social
capital accrues over time as networks emerge and evolve,
and since individuals gain different social positions in the
emergent network, capital is not created uniformly across
agents; “better connected” agents possess more capital.
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While there are a number of somewhat different definitions
of social capital in the literature, these definitions share the
following set of features. First, social capital is a metaphor
about advantage, and it can be thought of as the contextual
complement of human capital; it is not depleted by use,
but rather depleted by non-use. Second, social capital
is a function of the collective social structure, and the
social positions of individuals; well connected individuals
possess more capital, and well connected networks possess
a larger shared value. Finally, the creation of social capital
exhibits inequality due to the heterogeneity of norms and
behaviors of the different social groups, which reflects on
their positions in the network.
Motivated by this discussion, this paper aims at
establishing the micro-foundations of emerging social
capital in an evolving network. In particular, we present a
comprehensive mathematical model for dynamic network
formation, where agents belonging to heterogeneous social
groups take link formation decisions (e.g. “follow” a user
on Twitter or ResearchGate [17] [18], “cite” a paper that
is indexed by Google Scholar, etc) which on one hand
gives rise to an endogenously formed network, and on
the other hand creates social capital for individual agents
and groups. We view social capital as: “any advantage or
asset that is accrued by an individual or a social group in an
evolving network due to the social position that they hold in the
underlying network structure. An advantage can correspond to
the extent of popularity, prestige, or centrality of an individual;
or the density and quality of an individual’s ego network.”
In our model, we consider that homophily, which is an
individual’s tendency to connect to similar individuals [11],
contextualizes economic rationality, i.e. homophily is what
creates the incentives for individuals to connect to each
other. However, the way individuals meet, the number of
links they form, and the way trust propagates among them
is governed by norms and behaviors, which generally vary
from one social group to another. We view the different
forms of social capital as being emergent by virtue of an
evolving network, where the evolution of the network is
highly influenced by both the actions of individuals, as
well as the norms and behaviors of social groups. Due to
the heterogeneity of the norms and behaviors of different
social groups, social capital inequality is exhibited, and
some groups would collectively acquire more prominent
positions in the network than others. In the following
subsection, we briefly describe the basic elements of our
model.
1.1 A micro-foundational perspective of network evolu-
tion and social capital emergence
The central goal of the paper is to study the micro-
foundations of different forms of emerging social capital
via a mathematical model for network evolution. In our
model, networks are formed over time by the actions of
boundedly rational agents that join the network and meet
other agents via a random process that is highly influenced
by the dynamic network structure and the characteristics
of the agents themselves. Thus, networks evolve over time
as a stochastic process driven by the individual agents,
where the formation of social ties among agents are in part
endogenously determined, as a function of the current
network structure itself, and in part exogenously, as a
function of the individual characteristics of the agents.
Agents have bounded rationality, i.e. they only have
information about other agents they meet over time, they
are not able to observe the global network structure or
reason about links formed by others, and they are myopic
in the sense that they take linking decisions without
taking possible future meetings into account. We focus
on the impact of various exogenous parameters that
describe the norms and behaviors of heterogeneous social
groups, on the endogenously evolving network structure,
and consequently on the emerging social capital. Fig. 1
depicts all such exogenous and endogenous parameters.
In the following, we provide definitions for the exogenous
parameters under study.
1- Type Distribution: Agents are heterogeneous as they
possess type attributes that designate the social groups to
which they belong. A social group is a group of individuals
with the same occupation, social class, age, gender, religion,
race or ethnicity, and are assumed to follow the same norms
and behavior. The experiences of the different interacting
social groups in the network are generally not symmetric;
thus, social capital is created non-uniformly across them.
The type distribution corresponds to the relative population
share of different social groups, and represents the fraction
of agents of each type in the network. We say that an agent
belongs to a type minority to qualitatively describe a scenario
where the fraction of agents of the corresponding type in
the population is small, and we say that an agent belongs
to a type majority otherwise.
2- Homophily: Homophily refers to the tendency of agents
to connect to other similar-type agents; it is widely regarded
as a pervasive feature of social networks [25][26][27]. We
capture the extent to which an agent is homophilic by an
exogenous homophily index, which we formally define in
Section 2. The homophily index can be thought of as
the amount of “intolerance” that a certain type of agents
have towards making contacts with other types. It can
also represent the “closed-mindedness” of a social group;
low homophilic tendency means that agents are eager to
connect and accept views of other social groups, whereas
high homophilic tendency means that agents restrict their
social ties to only like-minded individuals.
3- Social Gregariousness: Some types of agents can be
more sociable than others, and thus are willing to form more
links. Social gregariousness is simply measured by the
minimum number of links an agent is willing to make.
4- Structural Opportunism: Agents in the network are
said to be opportunistic if they exploit their contacts to find
new contacts; thus, agents are more likely to link with
the neighbors of their neighbors if they are opportunistic.
Structural opportunism can also be interpreted as the flow of
trust among individuals; each agent trusts the connections
of his neighbors more than he trusts others. Opportunism
induces closure in the network, i.e. connections of an
individual are well connected, which on one hand may be
thought of as a source of increasing social support for an
individual, and on the other hand it can lead to information
redundancy, i.e. all connections of an individual possess
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similar information since they are well connected among
each other. Structural opportunism can also correspond to
a property of a behavior-dependent meeting mechanism;
for instance, users in Twitter are expected to retweet the
tweets posted by users they follow, which leads to the
followers of followers of a certain user to follow him.
Similarly, researchers find new papers to cite by looking at
the references of papers that they have already cited.
We focus on three different incarnations of social capital
that agents gain as the network evolves. These forms of
capital differ in terms of the type of advantage they offer
to agents, the way they are created and distributed among
agents and social groups, and their dependence on the
underlying norms and behaviors of social groups, which
are abstracted by the exogenous parameters. We focus on
directed networks, i.e. networks in which ties are formed
unilaterally such as Twitter and citation networks. In
particular, we focus on the following forms of social capital
that emerge in such networks.
1- Bonding capital: We define the bonding capital as
the aggregate informational and social benefits that an
individual draws from its direct neighbors in the network.
The bonding capital depends only on an individual’s ego
network (direct connections), and is invariant to the global
network structure as long as the local ego network is
preserved. The bonding capital increases if the ego network
is more homogeneous; individuals are better off when
connecting to other similar individuals. This is because
more similar individuals are more likely to provide more
social support and more relevant information. Since in our
model agents form links driven by homophilic incentives,
we measure the bonding capital by the agents’ utility
functions. This form of capital is close to the definitions of
Coleman and Bourdieu [1]-[3].
2- Popularity capital: In our model, we consider a directed
social network, thus links are formed by an individual
and others also form links towards that individual.
Individuals gain bonding capital by forming links to others,
and they also gain popularity capital by having other
individuals form links to them. The popularity capital
represents an individual’s ability to influence others. That
is, an individual’s popularity capital allows it to better
spread information and ideas in the network, and also
to gain support and agreement on the individual’s views
and opinions. We measure the popularity capital of an
individual by simply counting the number of individuals
forming links with that individual.
3- Bridging capital: Individuals who connect different
social groups are able to control the flow of information
across those groups and obtain non-redundant information
from diverse segregated communities, which allows them
to come up with innovations and new ideas [9]. Thus,
individuals can acquire a bridging capital because of their
centrality in the network rather than their popularity or
the quality of their ego networks. We measure the bridging
capital using a graph theoretic centrality measure, namely,
the betweenness centrality.
Examples of bonding capital include the knowledge
acquired by citing research papers, information and news
obtained from following users on Twitter, etc. Popularity
capital includes the number of citations associated with a
published paper, the impact factor of a journal, the number
of followers of a user on Twitter [16], etc. Examples of
bridging capital include conducting interdisciplinary re-
search, creating cross-cultural memes on Twitter, etc. Bond-
ing capital helps individuals acquire knowledge, informa-
tion and support, which allows them to accomplish tasks
[15], whereas popularity capital can give financial returns
(such as research funds for popular scholars), or intellectual
influence (such as in the case of citation networks) [18]. Fi-
nally, bridging capital leads to innovation [9], i.e. innovative
interdisciplinary research [63]; cross-cultural creative con-
tent generated by internet users [66]; or acquisition of non-
redundant information about job opportunities in informal
organizational networks [8]. Fig. 1 depicts the framework of
the paper; we focus on four different exogenous parameters,
which abstract the norms and behaviors of social groups,
and study their impact on the emergence of the three forms
of social capital discussed above.
1.2 Preview of the results
The central questions addressed in this paper are: how
do bonding, popularity, and bridging forms of capital
emerge simultaneously in an evolving network? Which
social groups possess which forms of capital? How is the
capital accrued by a social group affected by its norms and
behavior? We classify our results based on the different
forms of capital as follows.
1- Bonding capital and the egocentric value of networking:
In Section 3, we study the emergence of bonding capital by
characterizing the ego networks of individual agents in terms
of the time needed for an agent to form its ego network, and
the types of agents in that network. We show that majority
and opportunistic types are more likely to establish their
ego networks in a short time period. Moreover, we show
that extreme homophilic tendencies for all social groups
is a necessary and sufficient condition for maximizing the
aggregate bonding capital of the society – so we show
that polarization in a society maximizes bonding capital.
However, we also show that polarization in a society leads
to “structural holes” in the network that is formed, and
these structural holes hinder the exchange of information
and ideas.
2- Popularity capital and preferential attachment: In
Section 4, we show that the acquisition of popularity
capital displays a preferential attachment effect due
to the individuals’ structural opportunism. In other
words, the popular individuals get more popular as
structural opportunism promotes the propagation of
trust and reputation across the network, which endows
popular agents with “reputational advantages” over
time. Furthermore, we show that in tolerant (non-
homophilic) societies, an individual’s age and the collective
gregariousness of social groups are the forces that determine
an agent’s popularity capital, whereas homophily can create
asymmetries in the levels of popularity attained by different
social groups; more gregarious types of agents have more
chances to become popular, whereas the type distribution
plays no significant role in the rate of accumulation of
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popularity capital.
3- Bridging capital and the strength of weak ties: In
Section 5, we show via simulations that in a homophilic
society, individuals who belong to less gregarious, less
opportunistic, or major types are likely to be more central
in the network and thus acquire a bridging capital within
their social groups. Moreover, we emphasize the strength
of weak ties by showing that when a social group has a
different attitude towards homophily compared to all other
groups, it ends up being the most central in the network.
In particular, we show that the structural holes created
in extremely homophilic networks represent a potential
source of bridging capital for “open-minded” social groups;
non-homophilic individuals can fill these holes and broker
interactions at the interface between different groups, which
allows them to be the most central agents, even if they
are neither the most popular nor represent a majority type
in the network. Furthermore, we show that in extremely
non-homophilic societies, homophilic social groups are the
most central; that is, despite the absence of cross-group
structural holes, homophilic agents reside in the center of
the network, acting as an information hub or a dominant
coalition, through which information diffusion is controlled.
1.3 Related works
To the best of the authors’ knowledge, none of the network
formation models in literature have studied the emerging
social capital associated with endogenously formed net-
works. Qualitative studies on social capital by contempo-
rary sociologists such as Coleman, Bourdieu, Lin, Putnam,
Portes and Granovetter can be found in [1]-[10], [13]-[16].
These studies give qualitative definitions for the social cap-
ital in general (not necessarily networked) societies along
with some hypotheses about its emergence in different
societies, and they support their hypotheses on the basis of
historical and experimental evidence. Moreover, empirical
and qualitative studies on the social capital in Online Social
Networks (OSN) were carried out in [16], [66] and [68].
These works have given qualitative insights into the emer-
gence of social capital in OSNs mainly based on data, e.g.
the number of followers and followees of a user on Twitter,
the frequency of interaction and message exchange among
users in Facebook, etc. All these works do not come up
with mathematical models for the emerging social capital in
evolving social networks, thus they neither offer a concrete
understanding and explanation for the micro-foundations of
social capital, nor offer a counterfactual analysis for different
scenarios of network evolution.
While no mathematical model has studied emergent so-
cial capital in networks, there exists a voluminous literature
focusing on network formation models. Previous works on
network formation can be divided into three categories:
networks formed based on random events [22], [23],[24], [28]-
[37], [54], networks formed based on strategic decisions [40]-
[46], [55], and empirical models distilled by mining net-
works’ data [17]-[19], [21], [47]-[52], [59]. While a fairly large
literature has been devoted to developing mathematical
models for network formation, a much smaller literature
attempts to interpret and understand how networks evolve
over time, how individual agents affect the characteristics
of such networks, and the “value” of social networking
conceptualized in terms of social capital. Probabilistic mod-
els based on random events are generative models that
are concerned with constructing networks that mimic real-
world social networks. In [28]-[39], agents get connected in
a pure probabilistic manner in order to realize some degree
distribution [28], or according to a preferential attachment rule
[29][30]. While such models can capture the basic structural
properties of social networks, they fail to explain why and
how such properties emerge over time.
In contrast, strategic network formation models such as
those in [40]-[44], and our previous works in [45][46], can
offer an explanation for why certain network topologies
emerge as an equilibrium of a network formation game.
However, these results are limited to studying network
stability and efficiency, and provide only very limited insight
into the dynamics and evolution of networks. Moreover,
although mining empirical data can help in building al-
gorithms for detecting communities [49]-[52], predicting
agents’ popularity [48], or identifying agents in a network
[47], it is of limited use in understanding how networks
form and evolve.
2 MODEL
2.1 Network model
We construct a model for a growing and evolving social
network. Time is discrete. One agent is born at each mo-
ment of time; we index agents by their birth dates i ∈
{1, 2, . . ., t, . . .}. Agents who are alive at a given date t have
the opportunity to form (directed) links; we write Gt for the
network that has been formed (by birth and linking) at time
t. As we will see, this is a random process {Gt}∞t=0.Wewrite
Gt for the space of all possible networks that might emerge
at time t and ΩG for the space of all possible realizations
of the network process. At date t ∈ N, a snapshot of the
network is captured by a step graph Gt = (Vt, Et), where Vt
is the set of nodes, Et = {et1, e
t
2, . . ., e
t
|Et|} is the set of edges
between different nodes, with each edge etk being an ordered
pair of nodes etk = (i, j) (i 6= j, and i, j ∈ V
t), and |Et| is the
number of distinct edges in the graph. We emphasize that
Gt is a directed graph. Nodes correspond to agents (social
actors) and edges correspond to directed links (social ties)
between the agents. The adjacency matrix of Gt is denoted
by AtG = [A
t(i, j)], At(i, j) ∈ {0, 1}, At(i, i) = 0, ∀i, j ∈ Vt.
An entry of the adjacency matrix At(i, j) = 1 if (i, j) ∈ Etk,
and At(i, j) = 0 otherwise. If At(i, j) = 1, then agent i has
formed a link with agent j, and we say that j is a “followee”
of i, and i is a “follower” of j. The directed nature of
a link indicates the agent forming the link, and only this
agent obtains the social benefit of linking and pays the link
cost. The indegree of agent i is the number of links that are
initiated towards i, denoted by deg−i (t), while the outdegree,
denoted by deg+i (t), is the number of links initiated by
agent i. Agents i and j are connected if there is a path of
edges from i to j (ignoring directions); a component is a
maximal connected set of agents. A singleton component is
a component comprising one agent. The number of non-
singleton components of a step graph Gt is denoted by
ω (Gt), where 1 ≤ ω (Gt) ≤ |Vt|.
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Each agent i is described by a type attribute θi, which
belongs to a finite set of types θi ∈ Θ,Θ = {1, 2, 3, . . ., |Θ|},
where |Θ| is the number of types. The type of an agent
abstracts the social group to which it belongs; and all agents
belonging to the same social group have the same charac-
teristics and will follow the same behavior. The set of type-k
agents at time t is denoted by Vtk, where V
t =
⋃|Θ|
k=1 V
t
k, and
Vtk
⋂
Vtm = ∅, ∀k,m ∈ Θ, k 6= m. We define the length-L
ego network of agent i at time t, Gti,L, as the subgraph of G
t
induced by node i, and any node j that can be reached via a
directed path of length less than or equal to L starting from
node i. In this paper, an “ego network” generally refers to
the length-1 ego network of an agent.
There are three aspects of network formation: agents are
born; agents meet; agents form links. Birth is governed by a
stationary random process; meeting is governed by a non-
stationary random process; linking is governed by active
choices. We describe each of these processes in the following
subsections.
2.2 The Birth Process
At time 0 the network is empty (G0 = ∅). Agents are born
one at a time at each date t according to a stationary stochas-
tic process λ(t) = {θt}t∈N, with a sample space Λ = ΘN,
i.e. Λ = {(θ1, θ2, . . .) : θt ∈ Θ, ∀t ∈ N}. We assume that the
types of agents are independent and identically distributed
(θi and θj are independent for all i 6= j), and that the agents’
type distribution is P(θi = k) = pk, where
∑
k∈Θ pk = 1, so,
λ(t) is a Bernoulli scheme. At date t, the expected number
of type-k agents in the network is pkt, the total number of
agents is t, i.e. |Vt| = t, and limt→∞
|Vtk|
|Vt| = pk. Using Borel’s
law of large numbers, we know that
P
(
lim
t→∞
1
t
∣∣Vtk∣∣ = pk
)
= 1.
In other words, for a sufficiently large network size (and age
t), the actual fraction of agents of each type in the network
converges almost surely to the prior type distribution of the
Bernoulli scheme.
2.3 The Meeting Process
At each moment in time t, every agent iwho is alive at time t
(i.e. i ≤ t) meets one other agentmi(t) (identified by its birth
date). The meeting process is random (described in detail
below); we write Mi(t) = {mi(t)}
i+Ti−1
t=i for the meeting
process of agent i. The meeting process may stop at some
finite time Ti (the stopping time) or continue indefinitely
(in which case Ti = ∞). The sample space of the meeting
process is given by M. Agents meet other agents who
belong to one of two choice sets 1, namely the set of followees
of followees and the set of strangers. Unlike the birth process,
which is stationary, the meeting process depends on the
current network, which in turn depends on the past history:
the probability that agent i meets agent j at time t depends
on their relative positions in the network at time t, which in
turns depend on the sequence of meetings for both agents
up to time t − 1. Moreover, the probability that a certain
1. This terminology was first introduced by Bruch and Mare in [53].
sample path of the meeting process occurs depends on all
the exogenous parameters shown in Fig. 1.
Given a time t, an agent i alive at time t, and the
existing network Gt, write N+i,t for the set of followees of
i and Ki,t =
(⋃
j∈N+
i,t−1
N+j,t−1/ {i}
)
/N+i,t−1 for the set of
followees of followees of agent i. Everyone who is neither a
followee nor a followee of followee is a stranger. (Note that
the newly born agent t is always a stranger.) At time t agent
i meets either a followee of a followee or a stranger; the
probabilitity of meeting a followee of a followee (if one
exists) is an exogenous parameter γk ∈ [0, 1] (where k is
the type of i), which we think of as structural opportunism
(taking advantage of opportunities 2), where γk = 1 for fully
opportunistic agents, and γk = 0 for fully non-opportunistic
agents.
Denote the set of type-k followees of agent i ∈ Vt by
N+,ki,t , and the set of all followees of i as N
+
i,t =
⋃|Θ|
k=1N
+,k
i,t ,
where |N+i,t| = deg
+
i (t). Similarly, we denote the follow-
ers of agent i by N−i,t, where |N
−
i,t| = deg
−
i (t). Define
the set Ki,t =
(⋃
j∈N+
i,t−1
N+j,t−1/ {i}
)
/N+i,t−1 as the set
of followees of followees of agent i at time t, and the set
K¯i,t = Vt/
{
Ki,t
⋃
N+i,t−1
⋃
i
}
as the set of strangers to
agent i at time t. The set of same type followees of fol-
lowees is denoted as Kθii,t. Let N
s
i (t) = |N
+,θi
i,t |, N
d
i (t) =
deg+i (t) − N
s
i (t), Ki(t) = |Ki,t|, K
s
i (t) = |K
θi
i,t|, and
Kdi (t) = Ki(t)−K
s
i (t).
For t ≥ i, if there are no followees of followees, then i
meets a stranger with uniform probability. If there are fol-
lowees of followees, then imeets a followee of followee with
probability γk (and uniform over this choice set) and meets
an agent picked uniformly at random from the network with
probability 1− γk, i.e.
P (mi(t) ∈ Ki,t |Ki,t 6= ∅ ) = γθi + (1 − γθi)
Ki(t)
t− 1
,
and
P
(
mi(t) ∈ K¯i,t |Ki,t 6= ∅
)
= (1− γθi)
t− 1−Ki(t)
t− 1
,
whereas P
(
mi(t) ∈ K¯i,t |Ki,t = ∅
)
= 1. Note that since a
new agent is born at each time step, and such an agent is a
stranger to all other agents, then we have P
(
K¯i,t 6= ∅
)
= 1
for any time step t. At each time t, i meets a new agent; i
may or may not form a link to this agent. In addition some
agents may meet agent i, but i does not form links to those
agents. The meeting process realizes the limited-observability
of agents over time, i.e. agent i reasons about forming social
ties with only the agent it meets at time t, and cannot
observe the global network structure or the types of all
agents it does not meet. This is different from the complete
information and complete observability network formation
games in [29], or the preferential attachment models in [40]
which assumes that the linking behavior of a newly born
agent relies on its knowledge of all the degrees of other
agents.
2. The parameter γk can also be thought of as a realization of the
triadic closure; the flow of “trust” among connected individuals [54], or
as an exploration-exploitation behavior; an agent either explores the
network or exploits his current connections with different probabilities.
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2.4 The Linking Process
When agent i meets agent mi(t) at time t, it observes
the type of mi(t) and decides whether or not to form a
link with mi(t) (Thus true types of agents who meet are
revealed). Agents draw benefits by linking to others but link
formation is costly. Agents optimize so they form a new
link if the marginal benefit of that link exceeds marginal
cost. The marginal benefit depends on existing links and on
types; we assume that linking to agents of the same type is
(weakly) better than linking to agents of a different type –
this is homophily. For simplicity we assume marginal cost
of linking is a constant c.
We assume local externalities, i.e. linking benefits do not
flow to indirect contacts, so i derives benefits only from its
(direct) neighbors. For simplicity we assume that the utility
depends only on the number of followees of the same type
Nsi (t) and the number of followees of different typesN
d
i (t),
and has the form
uti
(
Gti,1
)
= vθi
(
αsθiN
s
i (t) + α
d
θiN
d
i (t)
)
− c
t−1∑
j=i
aji , (1)
where ati ∈ {0, 1} is the action of agent i at time t; a
t
i = 1
means that i links tomi(t), and a
t
i = 0 means that i decides
not to link to mi(t), and
∑t−1
j=i a
j
i =
(
Nsi (t) +N
d
i (t)
)
,
αsθi ≥ α
d
θi
, ∀θi ∈ Θ are the (type-specific) linking benefits,
vθi(x) : x→ R
+ is the (type-specific) social benefit aggregation
function. For convenience, we assume that vθi(x) is strictly
concave 3, twice continuously differentiable, monotonically
increasing in x, and vθi(0) = 0. That is, the marginal benefit
of forming links diminishes as the number of links increases.
This corresponds to the fact that agents do not form an
infinite number of links in the network, but rather form a
“satisfactory” number of links 4. As shown in (2), i decides
to link to mi(t) only if the marginal utility is positive. Note
that i’s link formation decisions depend not only on the
types of agents it meets, but also on the order with which it
meets these agents.
Agent i will form a link to mi(t) exactly when doing so
creates a network that yields higher utility for him. Agents
are myopic and form links without taking the future into
account. This seems to us to be a realistic description of
behavior in social networks.
2.5 The Exogenous Homophily Index and Social Gre-
gariousness
We propose a novel definition of an exogenous homophily
index for type-k agents, which is a variant of the well known
Coleman homophily index [37]. For an agent i of type k, let
N
+
i,t be the space of all possible sets of followees of i at
time t. The exogenous homophily index of type-k agents is
3. While we assume concavity of the utility function, our analysis
applies to any saturating function, e.g. the sigmoid function.
4. For instance, in citation networks, the number of references cited in
a paper is finite and corresponds to the number of papers the authors
need to acquire knowledge, yet the number of citations on a specific
paper can be arbitrarily large.
the minimum fraction of same-type followees that type-k
agents desire. Thus, hk satisfies
P
(
lim
t→∞
inf
N+
i,t
∈N+
i,t
Nsi (t)
deg+i (t)
= hk
∣∣∣∣∣ θi = k, γk < 1
)
= 1, (3)
where 0 ≤ hk ≤ 1. Note that this index is exogenous
because it only depends on the agent’s utility function and
not the meeting process, thus it is independent from the
network evolution path. When type-k agents are indifferent
to the types of agents they connect to, i.e. type-k agents are
extremely non-homophilic, then we have αsk = α
d
k, which
means that limt→∞ infN+i,t∈N
+
i,t
Nsi (t)
deg+
i
(t)
= 0, ∀θi = k, i.e.
agent i can get satisfied by connecting to a set of followees
that does not contain any same type followee. On the other
hand, if agents restrict their links to same-type agents only,
then we have αdk = 0, and limt→∞ infN+
i,t
∈N+
i,t
Nsi (t)
deg+
i
(t)
=
1, ∀θi = k. We can provide a closed form computation for
the exogenous homophily index by connecting it to social
gregariousness. Define
L∗θi(α) = argmaxx∈Z
vθi
(
xαsθi + α
)
− xc, (4)
and
L¯∗θi(α) = argmaxx∈Z
vθi
(
xαdθi + α
)
− xc. (5)
It follows from the concavity of vθi(.) that L
∗
θi
(α) <∞ and
L¯∗θi(α) <∞, ∀α ∈ R. It can be easily shown that
L∗θi (0) = limt→∞
inf
Mi(t)∈M
deg+i (t).
Thus, the parameter L∗θi (0) represents the minimum num-
ber of links an agent will form with probability 1 in any
(infinite) realization of the formation process; this captures
social gregariousness. It can be shown that the exogenous
homophily index of agent i is given by 5
hθi =
L∗θi
(
αdθiL¯
∗
θi
(0)
)
L∗θi
(
αdθiL¯
∗
θi
(0)
)
+ L¯∗θi (0)
.
Thus, gregariousness and homophily are coupled. While
each type of agents has an exogenous homophily index,
which is network-independent, the actual fraction of same-
type links an agent will realize depends on the meeting pro-
cess and the individual agent’s experience in the network.
2.6 Summary: Exogenous Parameters
In summary, our model involves four exogenous parame-
ters:
• Homophily: the homophily of type-k agents is cap-
tured by the exogenous homophily index hk.
• Social gregariousness: the gregariousness of type-k
agents is captured by L∗k(0).
• Structural opportunism: the parameter γk reflects the
extent of structural opportunism for type-k agents.
• Type distribution: the fraction of type-k agents in a
large network (relative population share) is given by
pk.
5. A detailed proof can be found in Appendix A.
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ati = I{∆uti(mti)>0}
,
∆uti
(
mti
)
= vθi
(
αsθi
(
Nsi (t) + I{θmi(t)=θi}
)
+ αdθi
(
Ndi (t) + I{θmi(t) 6=θi}
))
− vθi
(
αsθiN
s
i (t) + α
d
θiN
d
i (t)
)
− c. (2)
Throughout this paper, we will use the notion of first-order
stochastic dominance (FOSD). We say that a pdf (or pmf) f(x)
first-order stochastically dominates a pdf g(x) if and only if
G(x) ≥ F (x), ∀x,with strict inequality for some values of x,
where F (x) and G(x) are the cumulative density functions.
We write X  Y for the two random variables X and Y
when X first-order stochastically dominates Y .
3 BONDING CAPITAL AND THE EGOCENTRIC
VALUE OF NETWORKING
Our model captures several different forms of capital that
an agent i might acquire over time:
• bonding capital reflects agent i’s direct utility;
• popularity capital reflects how other agents feel to-
ward agent i;
• bridging capital reflects agent i’s ability to connect
other agents.
In this section we focus on bonding capital; we discuss
popularity capital and bridging capital in following sections.
3.1 Ego network formation time
Unlike previous works where link formation is a one-shot
process (which is the case in [24], [30], [34]-[41], [43], and
[44]), links (and consequently the bonding capital) are cre-
ated over time in our model; individuals meet others and
decide to establish connections until they forms a “satisfac-
tory” ego network/network of followees. The time needed
for an agent to form its ultimate ego network/network of
followees is obviously an important aspect of network for-
mation. In this section, we characterize the bonding capital
in terms of the time needed for the emergence of an ego
network, as well as the utility resulting from bonding to
that ego network.
Based on the definition of the utility function in (1) and
(2), we know that there exists a finite number of connections
after which an agent stops forming links. The time horizon
over which the agent forms its ego network is random and
depends on all the exogenous parameters. For an agent i, the
ego network formation time (EFT) Ti is a random function
of the exogenous parameters, defined as
Ti ,
inf
{
t ∈ N : uτi
(
Gti,1
)
≥ uτi
(
Gti,1 ∪ j
)
, ∀θj ∈ Θ, τ > t
}
−i+1.
(6)
We emphasize that Ti is random: it depends on the network
formation process. We characterize the time spent by an
agent in the process of forming his ego network/network
of followees in terms of the probability mass function (pmf)
of Ti.
6 We denote the pmf of Ti as fTi(Ti) : N → [0, 1].
6. Note that Ti can be thought of as the stopping time of the linking
process. This can be easily proven by showing that the event Ti = T
only depends on the history of meetings and link formation decisions
up to time T .
The expected ego network Formation Time (EEFT) T i con-
ditioned on agent i’s type is given by
T i = EΩG [Ti |θi ] , (7)
where EΩG [.] is the expectation operator, and the expec-
tation is taken over all realizations of the graph process
(we drop the subscript ΩG in the rest of our analysis). We
say that agent i is socially unsatisfied if Ti = ∞; a socially
unsatisfied agent is an agent that never satisfies its gregar-
iousness requirements, i.e. agent i is socially unsatisfied if
deg+i (t) < L
∗
θi
(0), ∀t ≥ i. Such an agent keeps searching for
followees forever. In the following Lemma, we specify the
necessary and sufficient conditions under which a newly
born agent has a positive probability of becoming socially
unsatisfied.
Lemma 1. In order that agent i becomes socially unsatisfied
with positive probability, it is necessary and sufficient
that γθi = 1 and 0 < hθi < 1.
Proof See Appendix B.
This Lemma says that an agent gets unsatisfied if and only
if it is not extremely homophilic and at the same time does
not explore the strangers’ choice set in its meeting process.
In such a scenario, an agent’s meeting process is governed
by the actions taken previously by his neighborhood, which
may not allow that agent to meet with other agents of
diverse types. Unless otherwise stated, we assume that
γk < 1, ∀k ∈ Θ, thus agents never get trapped and all
agents have a finite EFT. In the rest of this subsection, we
characterize the EFT. We start by characterizing the EFT
for extreme cases of agents’ homophily in the following
Theorem.
Theorem 1.
1) If hk = 0, ∀k ∈ Θ, then the EFT for agent i is equal to
Ti = L
∗
θi
(0) almost surely.
2) If hk = 1, ∀k ∈ Θ, then the distribution of the EFT
for every agent i conditioned on its type converges to
a steady-state distribution, i.e. limi→∞ fTi (Ti |θi = k ) →
fkT (T ), and the EEFT for an agent i conditioned on its
type T i = E {Ti |θi = k} converges as follows
lim
i→∞
T i =
1
pk
+
L∗k(α
s
k)
(1− γk) pk + γk
.
Proof See Appendix C.
Thus, the EFT for agents joining a large network only
depends on their types. Theorem 1 says that when the
agents are not homophilic, there is no uncertainty in the
ego network formation process, then both the number of
links and the EFT are equal to L∗θi(0) almost surely. This
“deterministic” EFT is independent of the network, and
only depends on the agent’s gregariousness. That is, if
hk = 0, ∀k ∈ Θ, then an agent’s journey in the network
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Fig. 1: Stochastic ordering of the EFT with respect to the exogenous parameters.
is determined by how it values linking, and not by the
network structure or the actions of others. If agents are more
sociable, i.e. are more gregarious, then they will spend more
time searching for followees, yet this time is deterministic
and only depends on parameters that are determined by the
agent and not the network. On the other hand, if agents
are extremely homophilic, then the agent’s journey in the
network will depend randomly on meetings with other
agents with whom they do not form any links. It is clear
from Theorem 1 that the EEFT of extremely homophilic
agents depends on the type distribution and opportunism,
in addition to gregariousness. We emphasize these depen-
dencies in the following corollary.
Corollary 1. (Gregarious agents and minorities search for fol-
lowees longer, opportunistic agents search shorter) If hk =
1, ∀k ∈ Θ, L˜∗θi(0) ≥ L
∗
θi
(0), p˜θi ≥ pθi , and γ˜θi ≥ γθi ,
then for an agent i born in an asymptotically large
network we have that
Ti
(
pθi , γθi , L
∗
θi(0)
)
 Ti
(
pθi, γθi , L˜
∗
θi(0)
)
,
Ti
(
pθi , γθi , L
∗
θi(0)
)
 Ti
(
p˜θi, γθi , L
∗
θi(0)
)
,
Ti
(
pθi , γθi , L
∗
θi(0)
)
 Ti
(
pθi, γ˜θi , L
∗
θi(0)
)
,
where Ti
(
pθi , γθi , L
∗
θi
(0)
)
is the EFT associated with the
exogenous parameter tuple
(
pθi , γθi , L
∗
θi
(0)
)
.
Proof See Appendix D.
Note that stochastic dominance implies domination in
mean. That is, if Ti
(
pθi, γθi , L
∗
θi
(0)
)
 Ti
(
pθi , γθi , L˜
∗
θi
(0)
)
,
then T i
(
pθi , γθi , L
∗
θi
(0)
)
≤ T i
(
pθi , γθi , L˜
∗
θi
(0)
)
. Moreover,
stochastic dominance implies domination of the expectation
of any increasing function of the EFT; if the bonding capital
is a decreasing function of the EFT, then one can infer
the impact of the exogenous parameters on the expected
bonding capital directly from the results of Corollary 1.
Corollary 1 says that in homophilic societies, the EFT
of a social group increases (in the sense of FOSD) as the
gregariousness of that group increases. This is intuitive since
the more followees an agent is willing to follow, the longer
it takes to find those followees. Moreover, agents belonging
to minorities are expected to spend more time in the link
formation process. This is again intuitive since when the
fraction of similar-type agents in the population is small,
each agent would need to meet a longer sequence of agents
in order to find similar-type followees. Finally, the EFT
decreases in the sense of FOSD as structural opportunism
increases. This is because once the agent becomes attached
to a network component of similar-type agents, it is then
better to be opportunistic and keep meeting the followees
of followees who are guaranteed to be similar-type agents,
rather than meeting strangers with uncertain types. In this
context, structural opportunism captures what Mayhew
calls “structuralist” homophily effects in [26], and what
Kossinets andWatts refer to as “induced homophily” in [27],
which corresponds to the fact that similar-type agents are
more likely to “meet” when agents are opportunistic.
Note that the meeting process, encoded in the structural
opportunism, plays a more crucial role for “minor” types in
homophilic societies as we show in the following Corollary.
Corollary 2. If hk = 1, ∀k ∈ Θ, then for an agent i born in an
asymptotically large network, the following is satisfied:
1) If agent i belongs to a minor type (pθi → 0),
then we have that limγθi→1 T i =
1
pθi
+ L∗θi(0), and
limγθi→0 T i =
L∗θi
(0)
pθi
.
2) If agent i belongs to a major type (pθi → 1), then for
every γθi we have that limγθi→0 T i = L
∗
θi
(0).
Thus, if minor types exploit their current connections to form
new links, their EEFT becomes inversely proportional to
their population size pθi with an additive gregariousness
parameter, whereas if the minor types explore the network
by meeting strangers, their EEFT becomes inversely pro-
portional to their population size pθi with a multiplicative
gregariousness parameter. Therefore, minor types need to be
more opportunistic for their EEFT to decrease. On the other
hand, agents belonging to a “major” type with pθi → 1
have an EEFT T i → L∗θi(0) regardless of their level of
opportunism. Thus, the EFT of major types is less affected
by the meeting process.
Fig. 3 reports simulations that illustrate the results of
Theorem 1 and Corollary 1. In Fig. 3(a), we can see that the
EEFT in an extremely homophilic society is greater than that
of a non-homophilic society, and as the network grows, the
EEFT for homophilic agents converges to the value specified
by Theorem 1. In Fig. 3(b), we plot the cdf of the EFT for
homophilic agents with different levels of opportunism, and
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we can see that the EFT of non opportunistic agents stochas-
tically dominates that of opportunistic agents. Similarly, we
demonstrate the impact of the type distribution in Fig. 3(c).
3.2 Ego network characterization: homophily and
structural holes
In the previous subsection we have characterized the time
needed for individuals to form their local ego networks,
and thus realize a bonding capital. A common aspect in
the definitions of bonding capital by Putnam [6], Bourdieu
[3], Coleman [1], Fischer [13], and Cobb [14], is that it
corresponds to the social support that individuals obtain
through networking. Social support includes companion-
ship, information exchange, emotional and instrumental
support. In our model, agents derive social support from
their followees; and such support is larger when the agent
and its followees are of the same type, i.e. if an agent con-
nects with same-type agents, they will acquire more relevant
information [15]. Thus, the types of agents in an agent’s
ego network determine its bonding capital. Based on this,
we consider an agent’s utility function, which represents
the agent’s net aggregate linking benefit, as an operational
measure for the bonding capital accumulated by that agent.
The bonding capital accumulated by an agent i at time t
is simply measured by its utility uti, whereas the bonding
capital of type-k agent is measured by their average utility
U tk =
1
|Vtk|
∑
j∈Vt
k
utj, and the bonding capital of all agents
in the network is U t = 1t
∑
i∈Vt u
t
i.
We note that a larger ego network does not imply greater
social or informational support. In fact, an agent might
establish an ego network that comprises many different-
type agents and will then have to pay the cost (time, effort,
etc) to maintain the links with them while getting little
social/informational support. For instance, a Twitter user
who follows many accounts spreading information that is
not relevant to the user’s interests leads to low bonding
capital: the user then spends time following such accounts
but gets low informational benefits. The utility of each agent
in a steady-state ego network is a measure for the support
that an individual can obtain from other individuals in his
local personal network. In the following Theorem, we show
that maximum bonding capital is only achieved in societies
with extreme homophily.
Theorem 2. (Homophily induces structural holes) Assume
hl > 0, ∀ℓ ∈ Θ. In order that the total average utility
U t converges to the optimal value U
∗
as the network
grows without bound it is necessary and sufficient that
hl = 1, ∀ℓ ∈ Θ. If this is the case then the network at any
time step will be disconnected almost surely and have at
least |Θ| non-singleton components.
Proof See Appendix E.
If all agents are extremely homophilic, then a discon-
nected network that maximizes the achieved utility always
emerges, and such a network is always disconnected even
with the limited observability of the meeting process. A
disconnected network obviously entails structural holes as
defined by Burt [8][9]: same-type agents form connected
components that do not communicate with other types of
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Fig. 2: The total average utility for various realizations of the
evolving social network.
agents, thus different types of agents do not exchange ideas
and information. As shown in Fig. 4, the optimal total
average utility is only achieved when agents are extremely
intolerant towards different-type agents. Thus, maximizing
the bonding capital in homophilic societies implies the
presence of structural holes. For any network with non-
extremely homophilic agents, the limited observability of
agents dictated by the meeting process allows the agents
to fill the network’s structural holes. In other words, what
makes the network connected is that not all similar-type
agents observe each other at each time step, but they can
potentially meet different-type agents with which they de-
cide to connect. If the meeting process allows unlimited
observability, i.e. mi(t) = Vt/{i}, then the agents will
always converge to a disconnected network with |Θ| non-
singleton components.
The major conclusion drawn from this section is that
homophily leads agents to reside in more homogeneous
ego networks, but also leads the agents to wait longer in
order to establish their ego networks, and induces structural
holes in the global network structure. Thus, on one hand
homophily unifies the local structure of the network by
gathering people with similar traits together, but on the
other hand it divides the global network structure since
dissimilar social groups become weakly connected. This
creates another potential source of capital, namely a bridging
capital, which we discuss in Section 5.
4 POPULARITY CAPITAL AND PREFERENTIAL AT-
TACHMENT
Since in our model we consider directed networks, we
distinguish between conventional bonding capital, which is
realized by homogenous networks of like-minded people
that provides social support for the individual, and popular-
ity capital, which corresponds to the individual’s influence in
the network that is gained by supporting others. Popularity
is an important form of social capital that represents an
individual’s influence on a social group; an individual’s
ability to spread opinions, information, and ideas; and also
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an individual’s acquisition for group support. For instance,
users of Twitter acquire popularity measured by the num-
ber of followers, which allows them to express opinions,
problems, and experiences, and acquire emotional support
provided by their online support groups (followers). Fol-
lowers retweet the tweets posted by users, which allows
those users to spread their ideas and opinions [16]. Similarly,
the popularity of researchers measured by the number of
citations or the h-index allows those researchers to promote
for new research ideas and directions. In this section we
study popularity capital and connect it to preferential at-
tachment, which is a central concept in network science.
The popularity of agent i at time t is simply given by
deg−i (t). We say that the popularity growth rate of agent i is
O (g(t)) if limt→∞
E
{
deg−
i
(t)
}
g(t) = 1, where the expectation
is taken over all realizations of the graph process given
that agent i is born with a type θi. (Note that the growth
rate is only uniquely defined “near infinity”.) The popu-
larity distribution (sometimes called the degree distribution
[24][33][36]) is denoted by f td(d), and corresponds to the
fraction of agents with a popularity level of d at time t,
i.e. f td(d) =
1
t
∣∣{i ∣∣deg−i (t) = d, i ∈ Vt }∣∣. For a given type
k, f t,kd (d) denotes the popularity distribution of type-k
agents at time t: f t,kd (d) =
1
|Vtk|
∣∣{i ∣∣deg−i (t) = d, i ∈ Vtk }∣∣.
Let ∆deg−i (t) be the number of followers gained by agent i
at time t, i.e. ∆deg−i (t) = deg
−
i (t)− deg
−
i (t− 1).
Preferential attachment has been used to explain the un-
derlying mechanism of networks growth [24], [29]-[31], [34]-
[36]. All of these previous papers model agents as forming
links only once; in our model, agents may form links many
times. More importantly, all of these previous models impose
preferential attachment as a behavioral rule (so network
growth is viewed as a conventional stochastic urn process);
in our model, preferential attachment emerges endogenously.
To fix ideas, we first provide a general definition of
preferential attachment that will be adopted in what follows.
Definition 1. (Preferential attachment) We say that preferential
attachment emerges in the network formation process if
deg−i (t) ≥ deg
−
j (t) implies ∆deg
−
i (t)  ∆deg
−
j (t).
In words: preferential attachment means that agents who
are more popular at a given time are likely to become even
more popular in the future.
4.1 Popularity capital in tolerant societies
We begin by studying popularity capital in societies with
extreme exogenous homophily index for all types of agents
given by hk = 0, ∀k ∈ Θ. It seems natural to refer to such
societies as tolerant (rather than totally non-homophilic). We
study the factors that create inequality of popularity capital
in tolerant societies. In the following Theorem, we begin by
studying the impact of the exogenous network parameters
on the popularity growth rates.
Theorem 3. (Popularity growth in tolerant societies) For a toler-
ant society popularity growth rates enjoy the following
properties:
• For γk = 0, ∀k ∈ Θ, the popularity of any agent i
grows logarithmically with time, i.e. E
{
deg−i (t)
}
is
O
(
L¯ log(t)
)
, where L¯ =
∑
m∈Θ pmL
∗
m(0).
• For γk = 1, ∀k ∈ Θ, the popularity of any agent i
grows at least sublinearly with time, i.e. E
{
deg−i (t)
}
is at least as fast as O
(
tb
)
, where b is given in
Appendix F and is the same for all types of agents.
Proof See Appendix F.
This Theorem demonstrates the impact of opportunism
and gregariousness on popularity accumulation. On one
hand, the popularity of agents in non-opportunistic societies
grows logarithmically with time – very slowly. On the other
hand, the popularity of agents in opportunistic societies
grows sublinearly with time – again slowly, but much faster
than for non-opporunistic agents. Thus, opportunism has an
enormous influence on popularity. As we show below, this
is a consequence of preferential attachment.
Corollary 3. (Emergence of preferential attachment) For a toler-
ant society, preferential attachment emerges if all agents
are opportunistic, i.e. γk = 1, ∀k ∈ Θ.
Proof See Appendix G.
In the following Corollary, we show that agents’ ages in the
network create inequality in the popularity capital.
Corollary 4. (Superiority of older agents in tolerant societies)
For a tolerant society, we have that deg−i (t)  deg
−
j (t)
for all i < j.
Proof See Appendix H.
Thus in the setting of Corollary 4, age is the only factor
that creates inequality in popularity capital. In the following
Corollary, we show that opportunism creates long term
popularity advantages for agents forming the network.
Corollary 5. (Opportunism is good in the long-run) If d1i (t)
is the popularity of agent i at time t in a tolerant society
with γk = 0, ∀k ∈ Θ, and d2i (t) is the popularity of agent
i at time t in a tolerant society with γk = 1, ∀k ∈ Θ,
then we have that E
{
d2i (t)
}
≤ E
{
d1i (t)
}
for all t ≤ T ∗,
and E
{
d2i (t)
}
≥ E
{
d1i (t)
}
for all t > T ∗, where T ∗ ≤
i ×
(
−L¯ W−1
(
−1
L¯
e
−1
L¯
)) 1
b
, b =
∑
m∈Θ pmL
∗
m(0), and
W−1(.) is the lower branch of the Lambert W function
[56].
Proof See Appendix I.
Thus, in societies where individuals are opportunistic, the
long-term popularity capital is harvested after a certain time
threshold as shown in Fig. 5. Such threshold is increasing in
the agents’ average gregariousness. Thus, younger agents
or agents in a society with large average gregariousness
need to wait longer to harvest the popularity gains attained
by opportunism. To sum up, in tolerant societies, only
age creates popularity capital inequality, and the growth
of the popularity capital is governed by both the level of
opportunism and the average gregariousness of the agents’
types. However, there is no inequality in the acquisition of
popularity capital across different social groups.
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4.2 Popularity capital in intolerant societies
We now study popularity capital in societies for which
hk = 1 for all k; it seems natural to refer to such societies as
intolerant (rather than totally homophilic). In the following
Theorem, we study the popularity growth rates for different
types of agents in the network.
Theorem 4. (Popularity growth in intolerant societies) For an
intolerant society, the popularity growth rates are given
as follows:
• For γk = 0, ∀k ∈ Θ, the mean-field approximation
for the popularity of every agent i grows logarithmi-
cally with time, i.e. E
{
deg−i (t)
}
is O
(
L∗θi(0) log(t)
)
.
• For γk = 1, ∀k ∈ Θ, the mean-field approximation
for the popularity of every agent i grows at least
sublinearly with time, i.e. E
{
deg−i (t)
}
is at least
as fast as O
(
tbθi
)
, where bk > bm if L
∗
k(0) >
L∗m(0), ∀k,m ∈ Θ.
Proof See Appendix J.
Thus, for tolerant and intolerant societies, the popularity
growth rates are qualititatively similar – but the sublinear
growth obeys a different exponent. In the following Corol-
lary, we show that gregariousness and opportunism create
inequality in the popularity capital.
Corollary 6. (Gregariousness and opportunism create inequality
in the popularity capital) For an intolerant society, and
for the two agent types k,m ∈ Θ in the network with
arbitrary pk and pm, the following is satisfied:
• If γk = γm, γk ∈ {0, 1}, and L∗k(0) > L
∗
m(0), then
there exists a time T ∗ < ∞ where E
{
deg−i (t)
}
≥
E
{
deg−j (t)
}
, for all t > T ∗, where θi = k and θj =
m.
• If γk = 1 and γm = 0, and L
∗
k(0) = L
∗
m(0), then
there exists a time T ∗ < ∞ where E
{
deg−i (t)
}
≥
E
{
deg−j (t)
}
, for all t > T ∗, where θi = k and θj =
m.
Proof See Appendix K.
This agent-level characterization can be further generalized
to the collective popularity of social groups in the following
Theorem; we show that the popularity distribution of a
more gregarious (or opportunistic) social group stochasti-
cally dominates that of a less gregarious (or opportunistic)
group.
Theorem 5. (Popularity capital inequality across social
groups) For an intolerant society, the following is sat-
isfied:
• If γk = γm, γk ∈ {0, 1}, and L∗k(0) > L
∗
m(0), then
f t,kd (d) first order stochastically dominates f
t,m
d (d)
assuming a mean-field approximation for the popu-
larity acquisition process.
• If γk = 1 and γm = 0 and L
∗
k(0) = L
∗
m(0), then
f t,kd (d) first order stochastically dominates f
t,m
d (d)
assuming a mean-field approximation for the popu-
larity acquisition process.
Proof See Appendix L.
Thus, for intolerant socieites, popularity is influenced by
gregariousness and structural opportunism rather than by
population share. See Fig. 6. In contrast with tolerant soci-
eties, a younger agent in an intolerant society can become
and remain more popular than an older agent if the younger
agent belongs to a more gregarious or more opportunistic
social group.
Theorem 5 can also be understood in the context of
citation networks [57]. In the context of citation networks,
intolerance means simply that papers only cite papers that
are really related – which is of course very common and
not at all unusual. [57] shows, in many scientific fields, that
there is a strong positive correlation between the number
of references per paper and the total number of citations.
We quote the following conclusion from the report in [58],
which is based on a statistical analysis of Thomson Reuters’
Essential Science Indicators database: “One might think that
the number of papers published or the population of researchers
in a field are the predominant factors that influence the average
rate of citation, but it is mostly the average number of references
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presented in papers of the field that determines the average citation
rate.” This conclusion is in perfect agreement with Theorem
5 (and Corollary 6), which predict that for the inherently
intolerant citation networks, the popularity of researchers
in different fields (total citation rate) is governed by their
“gregariousness” (number of references per paper), and not
by the type distribution (number of papers/researchers).We
know from [58] that papers in mathematics typically list
few references, while those in molecular biology typically
list many. Thus, molecular biologists are more “gregarious”
than mathematicians – and one would expect that younger
molecular biologists can, on average, become more “popu-
lar” – have higher citation indices – than mathematicians,
solely because of the differences between disciplines and
entirely unrelated to “quality” or “real impact”. This would
seem to provide caution for University review committees.
Of course, other dimensions in addition to popular-
ity/citation counts, express the value of scholarly work. One
of these dimensions is interdisciplinarity [63], which is a form
of bridging capital rather than a popularity capital as we
show in the next Section.
5 BRIDGING CAPITAL, CONNECTEDNESS AND THE
STRENGTH OF WEAK TIES
5.1 Betweenness centrality as a measure for bridging
capital
In Sections 3 and 4, we have studied two forms of capital
that share two basic features: they are egocentric in the sense
that they create value for individuals, and they are only
affected by the agents’ local network structures. Bonding
occurs when an individual socializes with similar individ-
uals driven by homophily, whereas bridging occurs when
an individual links multiple segregated communities. While
bonding creates egocentric values for individuals, bridging
creates shared value for the network, e.g. allows diverse
research communities to exchange ideas and innovations.
As Burt points out in [8], individuals with bridging capital
enjoy a central position in the network as they act as a
gateway for information exchange. Betweenness centrality,
a graph-theoretic measure promoted by Freeman in [12],
is a conventional measure for centrality since for a given
agent it counts the number of shortest paths between any
two agents that involves that agents, and thus reflects the
agents’ ability to broker interactions at the interface between
different groups [60]-[64]. The betweenness centrality of
agent i at time t, which is denoted by bti, is an indicator
of its centrality in the network [12], and is given by
bti =
∑
k 6=j 6=i
σkj(i)
σkj
, (8)
where σkj is the total number of shortest paths between
k and j in Gt ignoring the edge directions, and σkj(i) is
the number of such paths that pass through i. In order
to characterize the centrality of a certain social group, we
define the average betweenness centrality of type-k agents
b¯tk as follows
b¯tk =
1
|Vtk|
∑
i∈Vt
k
bti.
Betweenness is a relational measure: an agent with a high
betweenness centrality score does not belong to one of the
dense groups, but relates them. While the evolving network
is modelled as a directed graph, we capture the bridging
capital by computing the betweenness centrality of agents in
the simplified undirected version of the graph Gt. This is be-
cause bridging capital reflects the structural centrality of the
agent, i.e. to what extent an agent is “between” segregated
groups, whereas the edge directions reflect the directions
of information flow. As shown in Fig. 7, a central agent
can either disseminate information to segregated groups,
transfer information from one group to another, or gather
information produced by different groups. In Fig. 7, the cen-
tral agent has the same betweenness centrality score in the
networks (a), (b), and (c), yet the role played by that agent in
each network is different. In (a), the central agent gets non-
redundant information from community 1 and community
2, which allows that agent to come up with innovations and
new ideas. In (b), the central agent transfers information
from community 1 to community 2, which allows that
agent to control the flow of information across groups. In
(c), the central agent displays influence on community 1
and community 2 by disseminating information to those
communities. In the three networks, the bridging capital (i.e.
extent of the agent’s betweenness) is the same, yet the role
of the central agent and the nature of its social advantage
is different. We are interested in characterizing the extent of
structural centrality of the agents in the network rather than
the specific roles they play at the interface between groups.
Characterizing the betweenness centrality for a general
network is not mathematically tractable, and only empirical
and simulation results are obtained in the literature [60]-[61].
We start by presenting simulation results for the between-
ness centrality of agents in a network with 2 types, and show
the impact of the exogenous parameters. In Fig. 8, we plot
estimates for the expected average betweenness centrality
of 2 types of extremely homophilic agents obtained via a
Monte Carlo simulation, highlighting the impact of gre-
gariousness, type distribution, and structural opportunism.
In Fig. 8(a), we can see that increasing gregariousness de-
creases centrality, which is intuitive since when each agent
forms many links, the number of shortest paths that involve
far agents in terms of the geodesic distance will decrease,
which leads to a decrease in the average centrality of the
whole social group. That is, when all agents are sociable,
then all agent are less central (on average). This is in striking
contrast with the popularity capital, where gregariousness
of agents in a social group was helping them acquiring
popularity. Moreover, we can see in Fig. 8(b) that the type
distribution plays a role in determining the agents’ central-
ity; majorities are more central than minorities. Such result,
which agrees with the qualitative study of Ibarra in [65],
is again in a striking contrast with the popularity capital
acquisition where the type distribution had no significant
impact on the agents’ popularity growth rates. Finally, Fig.
8(c) shows that structural opportunism decreases centrality,
which is again in contrast with the popularity acquisition
experience where structural opportunism was allowing for
the emergence of preferential attachment.
From the simulation results in Fig. 8, we conclude that
homophily creates inequality in the acquisition of bridging capital,
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Fig. 5: Estimates for the average betweenness centrality of two types of agents in an extremely homophilic agents.
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(b) Centrality and utility of non-homophilic, non-exploring agents in a
homophilic society.
Fig. 6: Betweenness centrality and average utility of agents in a network that exhibits structural holes.
and the different behaviors and norms of different social
groups lead to the emergence of different forms of capital.
The way that inequality is created in those forms of capital
can have very different dependencies on the behaviors of
the social groups. When agents in a homophilic group are
very sociable, every agent is likely to be popular but not
central. That is, socialization increases the bonding capital,
but decreases the bridging capital. Moreover, minorities
have the same chance as majorities to become popular, yet
they have less chances to be central.
The results in Fig. 8 and the discussion above are
concerned with the centrality of agents within their social
groups. However, a more interesting form of centrality
is the one that arises from bridging heterogeneous social
groups. In fact, this is the form of social capital that Burt
and Putnam have extensively studied in [6] and [8]. In the
following subsection, we introduce a new phenomenon that
provides insights into the interplay between centrality and
homophily.
5.2 Homophily and intergroup bridging
In this subsection, we study a striking phenomenon that
arises from the interplay between homophily and centrality.
In particular, we show via simulations that when a social
group possesses different homophilic tendencies compared
to all other social groups, they end up being the most central
group, and thus accrue the largest bridging capital. That is,
in an extremely homophilic society, non-homophilic agents
bridge segregated social groups, and thus become the most
central and gain access to diverse sources of information.
On the other hand, a homophilic social group in a non-
homophilic society ends up being the most central as they
form a highly connected core of the global network struc-
ture, which represent an information hub through which all
individuals are bridged.
5.2.1 Filling structural holes: the power of tolerance, open-
mindedness, and interdisciplinarity
As first pointed out by Granovetter in [7], weak ties (the ties
between individuals of different types) have strength as they
bridge different segregated social groups. Opinions, beliefs,
and ideas are more homogeneous within than between
groups, so individuals connected across groups are more
exposed to alternative ways of thinking and behaving. In
other words, brokerage across the structural holes between
homophilic groups provides a vision of new options that
are otherwise unseen, which stimulates new ideas and in-
novation, and also allows agents to control information flow
across different groups [9]. Thus brokerage creates a social
capital, namely a bridging capital, and centrality in such
case is gained by agents who link the segregated homophilic
groups.
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Fig. 7: A Snapshot for a network with h1 = h2 = 1, γ1 = γ2 = 1, and h3 =
1
3 . Non-homophilic agents acquire a central
position in the network when they are less opportunistic.
In Fig. 9, we demonstrate the interplay between bonding
and bridging capital in a network that exhibits structural
holes. We carry out a Monte Carlo simulation by simulating
1000 instantiations of the network and plot the average
utility and betweenness centrality of each type of agents
in the network. We assume that the network has 3 types
of agents, where type-1 and type-2 agents are extremely
homophilic, whereas type-3 agents have a homophily index
of h3 =
1
3 . Since type-1 and type-2 agents are extremely
homophilic, their bonding capital is maximized, yet both
types are disconnected, which creates an opportunity for
harvesting bridging capital by type-3 agents since such a
type can bridge the two disconnected communities. The
ability of type-3 agents to acquire bridging capital depends
on their meeting process, i.e. the extent to which they
explore the network. If non-homophilic individuals are not
exploring the network, then they will end up in a peripheral
position in the network, and may not construct their ego
networks in finite time (recall Lemma 1). Fig. 9(a) and 9(b)
depict the impact of the meeting process on the bridging
capital acquired by non-homophilic agents in a homophilic
society. It is clear from both figures that there is a tension be-
tween the bonding capital (expressed in terms of the average
utility), and the bridging capital (expressed in terms of the
average centrality). That is to say, homophilic type-1 and
type-2 agents acquire higher utility since they enjoy more
homogeneous ego networks than type-3 agents. However,
when γ3 = 0, type-3 agents are more central in the network
as they broker the interface between type-1 and type-2 social
groups. Contrarily, when γ3 = 1, type-3 agents acquire less
bonding and bridging capital as they do not explore the
network, thus they cannot bridge segregated groups, albeit
being non-homophilic.
Fig. 10 depicts the network structure at t = 1000 for var-
ious meeting processes. In Fig. 10(a), we see that when type-
3 agents (red colored) are fully opportunistic, they end up
being either marginalized (acquire a peripherial position) or
unsatisfied (never forms a satisfactory ego network). When
the network exploration rate increases, we see in Fig. 10(b)
that only a fraction of non-homophilic agents are prepherial
at any time step, yet an intermediate community of such
agents emerges and it bridges the otherwise segregated
social groups. When γ3 = 1, we see in Fig. 10(c) that all
non-homophilic agents will reside in the central community
and will acquire a central position. Such result provides the
following interesting insight: it is not enough for individuals
to be non-homophilic, tolerant, or open-minded in order to
harvest the bridging capital, but it is essential for them to
explore the network structure such that they meet diverse
types of agents. Thus, in a society where the meeting pro-
cess; reflected by policies, norms, regulations, geographical
constraints or rules; hinders network exploration, then the
existence of non-homophilic individuals does not guarantee
that structural holes will be filled. In the following Theorem,
we provide the necessary and sufficient conditions for any
network to be connected.
Theorem 6. (Network connectedness) An asymptoti-
cally large network is connected almost surely, i.e.
P (limt→∞ ω (G
t) = 1) = 1, if and only if there exists at
least one type of agents k ∈ Θ with hk < 1 and γk < 1.
Proof See Appendix M.
Theorem 6 says that the existence of non-homophilic
type of agents that explore the network with any non-zero
rate will guarantee network connectedness. The condition
of γk < 1 follows from our assumption that agents have
infinite lifetimes. If agents have finite lifetimes, then a
threshold on γk will decide the network connectedness. That
is to say, open-minded individuals will have a threshold on
the minimum rate of network exploration that is a function
of their lifetime, beyond which they will not be able to fill
the structural holes and acquire the largest bridging capital.
Thus, non-homophilic agents, who can be thought of as
being “tolerant” or “open-minded” individuals, can bridge
segregated social groups and become the most central in the
network when their meeting process involves exploring the
network.
The literature argues that the centrality of non-
homophilic (or tolerant and open-minded) individuals play
an important role in many networks. For instance, in the
context of citation networks, Leydesdorff proposes between-
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Fig. 8: Betweenness centrality and average utility of agents
in a network with a dominant information hub.
ness centrality as a measure of a journal’s “interdisciplinar-
ity”. In addition to the impact factor which is a measure of a
journal’s influence, centrality of a journal indicates the role
it plays in promoting innovative and interdisciplinary re-
search, which creates a social capital in the research citation
and collaboration networks [63][64]. Moreover, Burt empha-
sizes the role of centrality in the diffusion of information [8],
and the creation of new ideas as a result to the exposure to
non redundant sources of information [9]. It is worth noting
that bridging capital not only leads to egocentric returns to
individuals, but also creates a shared value for the network:
it stimulates innovative and interdisciplinary research ideas,
and allows for the diffusion of information along the global
network structure.
5.2.2 Emergence of information hubs: the power of the
dominant coalition
In the previous subsection, we have shown that non-
homophilic agents in a homophilic society acquire the
most central network positions and thus attain the highest
bridging capital. In this subsection, we show that in the
reciprocal scenario where there is one homophilic type of
agents in a non-homophilic society, homophilic agents end
up being more central than others. In Fig. 11, we plot the
average utility and betweenness centrality of 3 types of
agents forming a network, where types 1 and 2 agents
are extremely non-homophilic, whereas type 3 agents are
extremely homophilic. It can be observed that the average
centrality of type 3 agents dominates that of types 1 and 2.
This is because type 3 agents tend to connect to each other,
thus forming a dominant coalition or an information hub that
resides in the core of the network. The term “dominant coali-
tion” was coined by Brass in [67] to describe same-gender
highly connected influential agents in an organization’s
interaction network. Unlike the result of the previous sub-
section, homophilic central agents in a society dominated
by non-homophilic types of agents do not bridge structural
holes in the network, but rather form a densely connected
sub-network through which information is disseminated
over the entire network topology. In the context of citation
Fig. 9: The formation of an information hub in a network
with h1 = h2 =
1
3 , and h3 = 1. The extremely homophilic
type-3 agents form a dominant coalition that resides in the
core of the network.
networks, this result predicts that if types corresponds to
journals, then a journal that is highly cited and at the same
time maintains a self-citation rate that is significantly higher
than other journals is likely to form an information hub in
a network of papers. Fig. 12 illustrates the formation of an
information hub by the extremely homophilic agents in a
non-homophilic society, where it can be seen that the type-3
agents form a core sub-network that resides in the center of
the global network topology.
6 CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we presented a micro-founded mathematical
model of the emerging social capital in evolving social
networks. In our model, the evolution of the network and
of social capital are driven by exogenous and endogenous
processes, which are influenced by the extent to which indi-
viduals are homophilic, structurally opportunistic, socially
gregarious and by the distribution of agents’ types in the so-
ciety. We focused on three different forms of endogenously
emerging social capital: bonding, popularity, and bridging
capital, and showed how these different forms of capital
depend on the exogenous parameters. Bonding capital is
maximized in extremely homophilic societies, yet extreme
homophily creates structural holes that hinder communica-
tions across network components. Popularity capital leads
to preferential attachment due to the agents’ structural op-
portunism, which offers agents a cumulative advantage in
popularity capital acquisition. Homophily creates inequality
in the popularity capital; more gregarious types of agents
are more likely to become popular. However, in homophilic
societies, individuals who belong to less gregarious, less
opportunistic, or major types are likely to be more central
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in the network and thus acquire a bridging capital. Finally,
we studied a striking phenomenon that arises from the
interplay between homophily and centrality. In particular,
we showed that when a social group that possesses different
homophilic tendencies compared to all other social groups,
they end up being the most central group, and thus accrue
the largest bridging capital.
APPENDIX A
DERIVATION OF THE EXOGENOUS HOMOPHILY IN-
DEX
From (3), we know that the exogenous homophily index for
type-k agents is given by
hk = lim
t→∞
inf
N+i,t∈N
+
i,t
Nsi (t)
deg+i (t)
, ∀θi = k,
which can be rewritten as
hk = lim
t→∞
inf
N+i,t∈N
+
i,t
Nsi (t)
Nsi (t) +N
d
i (t)
, ∀θi = k.
The exogenous homophily index can be further rearranged
as
hk = lim
t→∞
inf
N+i,t∈N
+
i,t
1
1 +
Nd
i
(t)
Nsi (t)
, ∀θi = k. (A.1)
Thus, hk is obtained by finding the set of followees N
+
i,t
that maximizes limt→∞
Ndi (t)
Nsi (t)
. Note that for an agent i, the
achieved utility function is given by
uti = vθi
(
Nsi (t)α
s
θi +N
d
i (t)α
d
θi
)
−
(
Nsi (t) +N
d
i (t)
)
c.
Due to the concavity of the utility function, it follows that for
any two followee setsN+i,t and N¯
+
i,t ∈ N
+
i,t, if N¯
d
i (t) > N
d
i (t),
then N¯si (t) ≤ N
s
i (t). This can be easily shown by computing
the number of possible same-type followees given a certain
number of different-type followees. For instance, assume
that Nsi (t) and N
d
i (t) can take non-integer values, and let
gθi(x) =
∂vθi (x)
∂x . Thus, for any valid value of N
d
i (t), the
value of Nsi (t) is given by
Nsi (t) =
1
αsθi
(
g−1θi
(
c
αsθi
)
−Ndi (t)α
d
θi
)
.
Thus, Nsi (t) is a (weakly) decreasing function of N
d
i (t), and
maximizing limt→∞
Ndi (t)
Nsi (t)
entails maximizing the number
of different-type followees Ndi (t). Since the utility function
is concave, and the marginal benefit of adding a different-
type followee is always less than that from adding a
similar-type followee (which follows from the assumption
of αsθi > α
d
θi
), then the maximum number of different-type
followees in agent i’s ego network is equal to the number
of different-type followees agent i can link with given that
it is not linked to any similar-type followee. Thus, based
on the definitions in (4) and (5), the maximum number of
different-type followees is L¯∗θi(0), and the corresponding
number of similar-type followees is L∗θi(α
d
θi
L¯∗θi(0)). Such
followee set materializes for any realization of the meeting
process Mi(t) = {θ1, θ2, . . ., θx, θx+1, . . ., θTi}, where x ≥
L¯∗θi(0), θj 6= θi, ∀j ≤ x, i.e. agent i meets a “satisfactory”
number of different-type followees first, and then meets the
first similar-type followee. The exogenous homophily index
for type-k agents is then given by
hk =
L∗k(α
d
kL¯
∗
k(0))
L¯∗k(0) + L
∗
k(α
d
kL¯
∗
k(0))
,
where L¯∗θi(α) can be computed as follows
L∗θi(α) =
{
⌊L⌋ : vθi
(
Lαsθi
)
− vθi
(
(L− 1)αsθi
)
< c
⌈L⌉ : vθi
(
Lαsθi
)
− vθi
(
(L− 1)αsθi
)
> c
with L = 1αs
θi
(
g−1θi
(
c
αs
θi
)
− α
)
, and gθi(x) =
∂vθi (x)
∂x .
Similarly, L¯∗θi(α) can be obtained as follows
L¯∗θi(α) =
{ ⌊
L¯
⌋
: vθi
(
L¯αdθi
)
− vθi
(
(L¯− 1)αdθi
)
< c⌈
L¯
⌉
: vθi
(
L¯αdθi
)
− vθi
(
(L¯− 1)αdθi
)
> c
where L¯ = 1
αd
θi
(
g−1θi
(
c
αd
θi
)
− α
)
.
Fig. 11 shows an exemplary utility function with a
corresponding exogenous homophily index of 25 , which is
attained if the agent meets L¯∗θi(0) = 2 different-type agents
first, and then starts linking only with same-type agents.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
We start by showing that for any agent i, if γθi = 1 and
0 < hθi < 1, then P (Ti =∞|θi ) > 0. First, since hθi <
1, then agent i forms a link with the first agent it meets
regardless of its type, i.e. aii = 1 for any θmi(i) ∈ Θ. After
that, since γθi = 1, then agent i keeps meeting agents in
the followees of followees choice set Ki,t after it forms the
first link. Let Kθii,t ⊆ Ki,t be the set of type-θi followees of
followees. Thus, one possible event that can lead to an agent
getting socially unsatisfied is thatKθii,t becomes an empty set
in each time step. Therefore, the probability that agent i gets
socially unsatisfied can be lower bounded as follows
P (Ti =∞|θi ) ≥ P
(
∞⋃
t=i+1
Kθii,t = ∅
∣∣∣∣∣ θi
)
. (B.1)
The inequality in (B.1) follows from the fact that there are
other events that can lead to social unsatisfaction. How-
ever, it suffices to show that P
(⋃∞
t=i+1K
θi
i,t = ∅
∣∣∣ θi) > 0
in order to prove that P (Ti =∞|θi ) > 0. Note that
P
(⋃∞
t=i+1K
θi
i,t = ∅
∣∣∣ θi) can be lower bounded as follows
P
(
∞⋃
t=i+1
Kθii,t = ∅
∣∣∣∣∣ θi
)
> P
({
θmi(j) 6= θi
}i+L¯∗θi (0)−1
j=i
)
P

 i+L¯
∗
θi
(0)−1⋃
t=i
N+,θimi(t),t = ∅
∣∣∣∣∣∣ θi,
{
θmi(j) 6= θi
}i+L¯∗θi (0)−1
j=i

 .
Each agent of type other than θi have a non-zero probability
of having no type-θi agents in their followees set. To see why
this is true, consider any agent j with type θj 6= θi. Such an
agent can have a followee set that contains no type-θi agents
with a non-zero probability, which can happen when agent
j meets L∗θj (0) strangers in sequence, and all such agents
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turn out to be type-θj agents. Such event happens with a
probability that is lower bounded as follows
P
(
Nsj (t) = L
∗
θj(0) |θj
)
> (1− γθj )
L∗θj (0)−1
(
1
pθj
)L∗θj (0)
,
which is always positive for γθj < 1. We further show that
even for γθj = 1, any agent j has a positive probability for
not connecting to any type-θi agent. For instance, agent j
can initially connect to a type-θj agent, say agent k, which
happens with a probability of 1pθj
. Agent k in turn may
have connected initially to another type-θj agent, and such
an agent may also have connected initially to another type-
θj agent, and so on. Thus, if at each time step agent j meets
its type-θj followee of followee whom its followee has met
initially in the network, then agent j can end up being
connected to a set of exclusively same-type agents. It can
be easily shown that this happens with a probability that is
lower bounded by
P
(
Nsj (t) = L
∗
θj(0) |θj
)
>
p
L∗θj (0)
θj∏L∗θj (0)−1
m=0
(
(m+ 1)L¯∗θj(0)−m
) .
Since agent i can initially link to a different-type agent,
and since any different-type agent can have a set of fol-
lowees with no type-θi agents, it follows that the lower
bound on P
(⋃∞
t=i+1K
θi
i,t = ∅
∣∣∣ θi) is greater than zero, thus
P
(⋃∞
t=i+1K
θi
i,t = ∅
∣∣∣ θi) > 0.
Now we prove the converse, and show that if
P (Ti =∞|θi ) > 0, then 0 < hθi < 1 and γθi = 1. First,
since P (Ti =∞|θi ) > 0, then L∗k(α
d
kL¯
∗
k(0)) > 0, i.e. agent
i must add at least one similar-type followee in order to get
socially unsatisfied, and linking with L¯∗k(0) different-type
followees does not suffice to saturate the utility function and
terminate the meeting process, thus hθi > 0. Now assume
that hθi = 1. In this case, agent i forms its first link only
when it meets a similar-type agent, and after that it meets
a similar-type agent picked from Ki,t, or meets an agent
with an uncertain type picked uniformly at random from the
network. At each time step after agent i forms its first link,
the probability that it meets a similar-type agent is given by
P
(
θmi(t) = θi
∣∣deg+i (t) > 1) = γθiI{Ki,t 6=∅}+(1− γθi)t
∣∣Vtθi∣∣ ,
which for a large t converges to
lim
t→∞
P
(
θmi(t) = θi
∣∣deg+i (t) > 1) = γθi + (1 − γθi)pθi ,
which is always non-zero for any value of γθi . Thus, an
agent with hθi = 1 has a non-zero probability to meet
a similar-type agent at each time step, which implies that
limt→∞ deg
+
i (t) = L
∗
θi
(0), and P (Ti =∞|θi, hθi = 1) = 0.
Therefore, P (Ti =∞|θi ) > 0 implies that 0 < hθi < 1.
Moreover, we know that any agent with γθi < 1 will
experience the following meeting process in a large enough
network
P
(
θmi(t) = k
∣∣deg+i (t) > 1) = γθi
∣∣∣Kki,t∣∣∣
|Ki,t|
+ (1− γθi)pk,
which is lower bounded by
P
(
θmi(t) = k
∣∣deg+i (t) > 1) ≥ (1− γθi)pk.
Since (1− γθi)pk > 0, ∀k ∈ Θ, any agent with γθi < 1 has a
non-zero probability for meeting a similar-type agent at each
time step, which means that such an agent is not socially
unsatisfied in the almost sure sense. Thus, P (Ti =∞|θi ) >
0 implies that γθi = 1.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
We divide this proof into two parts. First, we prove that for
non-homophilic societies, the EFT of an agent i is equal to
L∗θi(0). Next, we show that in homophilic societies, the dis-
tribution of EFTs for the agents in a large network converges
to a steady-state distribution.
EFT for non-homophilic societies:
Recall that the exogenous homophily index of an agent i is
given by
hθi =
L∗θi
(
αdθiL¯
∗
θi
(0)
)
L¯∗θi(0) + L
∗
θi
(
αdθiL¯
∗
θi
(0)
) . (C.1)
We start by studying the case when hθi = 0. From (C.1),
we know that if hθi = 0, then L
∗
θi
(
αdθiL¯
∗
θi
(0)
)
= 0, which
means that L∗θi (0) = L¯
∗
θi
(0), i.e. agent i forms a link with
any agent it meets over time as long as its utility function is
not yet saturated. Therefore, at any date t ≥ i we have
P
(
ati = 1
∣∣θmi(t) ) =
{
1 : t ≤ L∗θi (0)
0 : t > L∗θi (0) .
Thus, agent i forms a link with all the agents it meets until
its utility function is saturated, which happens after L∗θi(0)
time steps almost surely, i.e.
P
(
Ti = L
∗
θi(0)
)
= 1.
The EFT of a non-homophilic agent i is independent of
the network structure and the types of agents it meets,
i.e. P
(
ati = 1
∣∣θmi(t), Gt ) = I{t≤L∗
θi
(0)
}. The EFT of agent
i is equal to L∗θi(0) almost surely since agent i meets
other agents at a constant rate and forms links with them
regardless of their types.
EFT for homophilic societies:
Now we focus on the case when hθi = 1. In this case, we
have L¯∗θi(0) = 0, ∀θi ∈ Θ, i.e. agents form links with same-
type agents only. At any time step, agent i forms a link with
the agent it meets if and only if the agent it meets is a same-
type agent and agent i’s utility function is not saturated,
thus each agent forms exactly L∗θi(0) links. The rest of the
proof is organized as follows: we first derive the probability
that an agent forms a link in a given time step, and then
we show that for a large network, this probability becomes
independent of the network topology, which implies that
the ego network formation process converges to a stationary
process.
In the following, we derive the probability that an agent
forms a link in a given time step. Note that the probability
that an agent i forms a link at a given time step conditioned
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on the current step graph (current network topology) and
the agent it meets can be written as
P
(
ati = 1
∣∣θmi(t), Gt ) = I{θmi(t)=θi,deg+i (t)≤L∗θi (0)}. (C.2)
From (C.2), and using Bayes rule, the probability that agent i
forms a link at time t conditioned on the current step graph
is given by
P
(
ati = 1
∣∣Gt ) = P (θmi(t) = θi ∣∣Gt ) I{deg+
i
(t)≤L∗
θi
(0)
}.
(C.3)
Note that the meeting process of agent i goes throught two
stages (see Section 2). Upon its arrival, and until it becomes
attached to the network by forming its first link, agent i
meets agents picked uniformly at random from the network,
and it forms its first link only if it meets a type-θi agent,
therefore, for deg+i (t) = 0, (C.3) can be written as
P
(
ati = 1
∣∣deg+i (t) = 0, Gt ) =
∣∣Vtθi∣∣− 1
|Vt| − 1
. (C.4)
After agent i becomes attached to the network (i.e.
deg+i (t) > 0), it starts meeting other agents picked from
two choice sets: the set of strangers K¯i,t, and the set of
followees of followees Ki,t. We know from the definition
of the meeting process in Section 2 that the probability that
agent i meets a type-θi agent is given by
P
(
θmi(t) = θi
∣∣deg+i (t) > 0, Gt ) =
((1− γθi)(1 − P(Ki,t = ∅)) + P(Ki,t = ∅))×
P
(
θmi(t) = θi
∣∣mi(t) ∈ K¯i,t ∪ Ki,t, Gt )+
γθi(1 − P(Ki,t = ∅))P
(
θmi(t) = θi
∣∣mi(t) ∈ Ki,t, Gt ) ,
(C.5)
which can be simplified as follows
P
(
θmi(t) = θi
∣∣deg+i (t) > 0, Gt ) =
γθiK
s
i (t)
Ki(t)
(1− P(Ki(t) = 0))+
(1− γθi + γθiP(Ki(t) = 0))
∣∣Vtθi∣∣−Nsi (t)− 1
|Vt| − deg+i (t)− 1
. (C.6)
The probability that the choice set Ki,t becomes empty
at any time step can be expressed as follows. First, note
that if the event Ki(t) = 0 happens, then agent i should
have been connected initially to an agent that has not yet
constructed its ego network, i.e. Nmi(τ)(τ) < L
∗
θi
(0) if i
has formed its first link at time τ . This is because otherwise
we will have Ki(t) ≥ L∗θi(0), ∀t ≥ τ , which implies that
P(Ki(t) = 0) = 1 at every time step. At any point of
time t > i, the probability that the choice set Ki,t becomes
empty is equal to the probability that Nmi(τ)(τ) < L
∗
θi
(0)
and the probability that the new linking actions of agents i
andmi(τ) has not led to the emergence of new followees of
followees. Therefore, we can bound P(Ki(t) = 0) as follows
P(Ki(t) = 0) ≤
1∣∣∣Vtθi
∣∣∣
∑
m∈Vt
θi
I{t<Tm}.
That is, the probability that the followees of followees
choice set of agent i becomes empty is always less than
the probability that agent i initially links to an agent with
an unsatisfied ego network. Therefore, the probability of
forming a link at any time step conditioned on the current
network topology is given by (C.7).
Note that the expressions in (C.7) depend on the actual
realization of the graph process at time t, i.e. the step graph
Gt. In the following, we show that this dependency vanishes
when the network is asymptotically large. First, since any
type-k agent has hk = 1, then all the followees of followees
for an agent i has a type θi, i.e. P
(
Ksi (t)
Ki(t)
= 1
∣∣∣Ki,t 6= ∅) =
1. Moreover, in a large network we have P(Ki(t) =
0) ≤ limt→∞
1∣∣∣Vtθi
∣∣∣
∑
m∈Vt
θi
I{t<Tm}, which is equiva-
lent to P(Ki(t) = 0) ≤ limt→∞
1
pθi t
∑
m∈Vt
θi
I{t<Tm}.
Since all agents are extremely homophilic, they have
finite EFTs (recall Lemma 1), which means that
limt→∞
1
pθi t
∑
m∈Vt
θi
I{t<Tm} = 0. Thus, in a large network
P(Ki(t) = 0) = 0, and Ki(t) is bounded by L
∗
θi
(0) ≤
Ki(t) ≤
(
L∗θi(0)
)2
. Furthermore, we have that
lim
t→∞
∣∣Vtθi∣∣−Nsi (t)− 1
|Vt| − deg+i (t)− 1
= lim
t→∞
pθit− L
∗
θi
(0)− 1
t− L∗θi(0)− 1
= pθi. (C.9)
This leads to the expressions in (C.8). It is clear from
(C.8) that for a large network, the probability of taking a
link formation decision at any time step depends only on
the current number of followees of agent i. Thus, linking
decisions depend only on agent i’s ego network, and are
independent on the global network structure.
Let N ji for j > 1, be the waiting time between forming
link j − 1 and link j by agent i, and N1i be the waiting
time between forming the first link and agent i’s birth date.
Thus, the EFT is given by Ti =
∑L∗θi (0)
j=1 N
j
i . Note that N
1
i is
the number of agents met by agent i before it forms its first
link. Therefore, when agent i is singleton, every meeting will
result in the formation of the first link with a probability
of pθi independent on the previous meetings, which means
that N1i is a geometric random variable with a success proba-
bility of pθi , and E
{
N1i
}
=
∑∞
m=1mpθi (1− pθi)
m−1
= 1pθi
.
Moreover, for a large network, the probability of forming a
link at time step t is
P
(
θmi(t) = θi
∣∣deg+i (t) > 0, Gt ) = (1− γθi) pθi + γθi .
Thus, after it forms its first link, agent i needs to form
L∗θi(0)− 1 = L
∗
θi
(αsθi) links, and the probability of forming
a link at any time step is (1 − γθi) pθi + γθi , which is
independent of the network topology and the history of
actions of agent i. Thus, N ji is a geometric random variable
with a success probability of (1 − γθi) pθi + γθi , where N
j
i
and Nmi are i.i.d (this means that for a large network and
extremely homophilic agents, the actions of an agent do
not affect the meeting process). Therefore, the distribution
of EFT for any agent i in an asymptotically large network
follows a fixed distribution, which follows from obtaining
the distribution of
∑L∗θi (0)
j=1 N
j
i , where N
1
i is a geometric
random variable with a success probability of pθi , and for
j > 1, N ji is a geometric random variable with a success
probability of (1 − γθi) pθi + γθi . Given that the random
variables
{
N2i , N
3
i , . . ., N
L∗θi (0)
i
}
are i.i.d, the pmf of the
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P
(
ati = 1
∣∣Gt ) =


|Vtθi |−N
s
i (t)−1
|Vt|−deg+
i
(t)−1
: deg+i (t) = 0
γθiK
s
i (t)
Ki(t)
(1 − P(Ki(t) = 0)) + (1− γθi + γθiP(Ki(t) = 0))
|Vtθi |−N
s
i (t)−1
|Vt|−deg+
i
(t)−1
: 0 < deg+i (t) ≤ L
∗
θi
(0)
0 : deg+i (t) > L
∗
θi
(0)
(C.7)
lim
t→∞
P
(
ati = 1
∣∣Gt ) =


pθi : deg
+
i (t) = 0
γθi + (1− γθi) pθi : 0 < deg
+
i (t) ≤ L
∗
θi
(0)
0 : deg+i (t) > L
∗
θi
(0)
(C.8)
sum
∑L∗θi (0)
j=2 N
j
i can be easily evaluated by taking the
product of the Moment Generating Functions (MGF) of the
individual random variables. The MGF of N ji is given by
SNji
(Ω) = E
{
eΩN
j
i
}
,Ω ∈ R, which can be obtained as
follows
SNj
i
(Ω) =
((1− γθi)pθi + γθi)e
Ω
1− (1− (1− γθi)pθi − γθi)e
Ω
,
for Ω < − log(1 − ((1 − γθi)pθi + γθi)). Thus, the MGF
of
∑L∗θi (0)
j=2 N
j
i is given by
∏L∗θi (0)
j=2 SNj
i
(Ω), which can be
written as
(
((1−γθi )pθi+γθi )e
Ω
1−(1−(1−γθi )pθi−γθi )e
Ω
)L∗θi (0)−1
, which corre-
sponds to the MGF of a negative binomial random variable. Let
N¯1i =
∑L∗θi (0)
j=2 N
j
i . The pmf of N¯
1
i is given by
fN¯1i
(
N¯1i
)
=
(
N¯1i − 1
L∗θi(0)− 2
)
pL
∗
θi
(0)−1 (1− p)N¯
1
i −L
∗
θi
(0)+1 ,
(C.10)
where p = ((1− γθi)pθi + γθi), and the pmf of N
1
i is given
by
fN1i
(
N1i
)
= p (1− p)N
1
i −1 . (C.11)
Thus, the pmf of Ti is obtained by computing the convolu-
tion of fN¯1i
(
N¯1i
)
and fN1
i
(
N1i
)
as follows
fTi (Ti) = fN1i
(
N1i
)
⋆ fN¯1i
(
N¯1i
)
, (C.12)
where ⋆ is the convolution operator. Therefore, the distribu-
tion of the EFT for an agents of type k converge to a steady-
state distribution, i.e. limt→∞ fTi (Ti |θi = k ) = f
k
T (T ) ,
where fkT (T ) = fN1i
(
N1i |θi = k
)
⋆ fN¯1i
(
N¯1i |θi = k
)
. Note
that from Scheffe’s lemma, convergence of the probability
mass functions implies convergence in distribution, thus the
sequence of EFTs converges in distribution for all types of
agents.
Now we compute the EEFT, which is simply given by
T i = E
[∑L∗θi (0)
j=1 N
j
i
]
. Thus, we have
E
[
N ji
]
=
{
1
pθi
: j = 1,
1
(1−γθi ) pθi+γθi
: 2 ≤ j ≤ L∗θi (0) .
Therefore, the EEFT is given by
T i = E
[
N1i
]
+ E

L
∗
θi
(0)∑
j=2
N ji

 (C.13)
= E
[
N1i
]
+
L∗θi
(0)∑
j=2
E
[
N ji
]
=
1
pθi
+
L∗θi(α
s
θi
)
(1− γθi) pθi + γθi
,
and the result of the Theorem follows.
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF COROLLARY 1
We first define the notion of first-order stochastic dominance
as follows. A pdf (or pmf) f(x) first-order stochastically
dominates a pdf g(x) if and only if G(x) ≥ F (x), ∀x, with
strict inequality for some values of x, where F (x) and G(x)
are the cumulative density functions. In this proof, we will
use first-order stochastic dominance and stochastic dominance
interchangeably. For the two random variables x and y, if
f(x) stochastically dominates f(y), then we say y  x. In
the following, we prove a Lemma that will be utilized in
proving this Theorem.
Lemma D.1. LetX1, X2, Y1, and Y2 be independent random
variables, and let Z1 = X1 + Y1 and Z2 = X2 + Y2. If
X1  X2 and Y1  Y2, then Z1  Z2.
Proof We prove the Lemma for continuous random vari-
ables, and the result can be straightforwardly gener-
alized to discrete random variables. Since X1  X2
and Y1  Y2, then we have FX1(x1) ≤ FX2(x2),
FY1(Y1) ≤ FY2(Y2),
∫
u(x1)f(x1)dx1 ≥
∫
u(x2)f(x2)dx2,
and
∫
u(y1)f(y1)dy1 ≥
∫
u(y2)f(y2)dy2, for any increas-
ing function u(.). Note that since Z1 = X1 + Y1 and
Z2 = X2 + Y2, then we have that FZ1(z1) =
∫
FY1(z1 −
x1)f(x1)dx1, and FZ2(z2) =
∫
FY2(z2 − x2)f(x2)dx2. Since
FY1(Y1) ≤ FY2(Y2) and X1  X2, then FZ1(z1) ≤ FZ2 (z2)
and it follows that Z1  Z2.
Lemma D.2. If Z1 =
∑N
i=1Xi and Z2 =
∑M
i=1Xi, where
N > M , and the variablesXi, ∀i ≤ N are i.i.d non-negative
random variables, then Z1  Z2.
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Proof Let X˜1 =
∑M
i=1Xi, and X˜2 =
∑N−M
i=1 Xi. We
can write Z1 as Z1 = X˜1 + X˜2. The cdf of Z1 is
then given by FZ1(z1) =
∫
FX1(z1 − x˜2)fx˜2(x˜2)dx˜2.
Since
∫
FX1 (z1 − x˜2)fx˜2(x˜2)dx˜2 ≤ FX1 (z1), ∀z1, and since
FX1(z1) = FZ2(z1), then FZ1 (z) ≤ FZ2 (z), ∀z, and it
follows that Z1  Z2.
The pmf under study in this Theorem is fTi(Ti), which
is the pmf of the EFT given a birth date and type of an
agent, i.e. fTi(Ti) =
∑
Gi−1∈Gi−1 fTi
(
Ti
∣∣Gi−1 ) P (Gi−1),
which we have shown that it converges to a steady-state
distribution in Appendix C. In the following, we apply
a comparative statics analysis for the different exogenous
parameters assuming a large enough network, and we
start by the type distribution. For p˜θi > pθi , we compare
Ti
(
pθi , hθi , γθi , L
∗
θi
(0)
)
and Ti
(
p˜θi , hθi , γθi , L
∗
θi
(0)
)
. We
first start by showing that for extremely homophilic agents,
we have Ti
(
pθi, hθi , γθi , L
∗
θi
(0)
)
 Ti
(
p˜θi , hθi, γθi , L
∗
θi
(0)
)
.
Recall from Appendix C that for a large network and
extremely homophilic agents, the EFT is simply given by
Ti = N
1
i + N¯
1
i , where the cdf of the two random variables
N1i and N¯
1
i are given by
F (N1i ) = 1− (1− p)
N1i ,
and
F (N¯1i ) = 1− I1−p
(
L∗θi(0), N¯
1
i − L
∗
θi(0) + 1
)
,
where p = ((1− γθi)pθi + γθi), I1−p(x, y) is the regularized
incomplete beta function, which is defined in terms of the
incomplete beta function B(1 − p;x, y) =
∫ 1−p
0 z
x−1(1 −
z)y−1dz as I1−p(x, y) =
B(1−p;x,y)
B(x,y) . The first derivative of
I1−p(x, y) with respect to p is given by
∂I1−p(x, y)
∂p
=
−(1− p)x−1py−1
B(x, y)
< 0,
thus, I1−p(x, y) is monotonically decreasing in p.
Now let p and p˜ be defined as p = ((1− γθi)pθi + γθi)
and p˜ = ((1 − γθi)p˜θi + γθi). If p˜θi > pθi , then p˜ >
p, and it follows that both 1 − (1 − p)N
1
i < 1 −
(1 − p˜)N
1
i , and 1 − I1−p˜
(
L∗θi(0), N¯
1
i − L
∗
θi
(0) + 1
)
> 1 −
I1−p
(
L∗θi(0), N¯
1
i − L
∗
θi
(0) + 1
)
, which from Lemma D.1
implies that the cdf of Ti for a type distribution p˜θi is
greater than or equal to the the cdf of Ti for a type
distribution pθi for all values of Ti. Therefore, we have
that Ti
(
pθi , hθi , γθi , L
∗
θi
(0)
)
 Ti
(
p˜θi , hθi, γθi , L
∗
θi
(0)
)
. The
same applies for the structural opportunism parameter γθi .
Let p and p˜ be defined as p = ((1− γθi)pθi + γθi) and p˜ =
((1 − γ˜θi)pθi + γ˜θi). If γ˜θi > γθi , then p˜ > p, and it follows
that Ti
(
pθi , hθi, γθi , L
∗
θi
(0)
)
 Ti
(
pθi , hθi , γ˜θi , L
∗
θi
(0)
)
. Fi-
nally, since Ti = N
1
i +
∑L∗θi (0)−1
j=2 N
j
i , then it fol-
lows from Lemma D.2 that if L˜∗θi(0) > L
∗
θi
(0), then
Ti
(
pθi , hθi , γθi , L˜
∗
θi
(0)
)
 Ti
(
pθi , hθi, γθi , L
∗
θi
(0)
)
.
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
We prove the Theorem through the following steps: we
show that a steady-state utility function exists for ev-
ery agent, and then we compute an upper-bound on the
achieved utility of an agent. We prove the Theorem state-
ment by showing that such an upper-bound is achieved if
and only if agents are extremely homophilic.
First, we show that a steady-state utility function exists
for every agent. Since γk < 1, ∀k ∈ Θ, we know from
Lemma 1 that the meeting process of each agent has a finite
stopping time. That is, for a large network each agent i
meets a same-type agent at each time step with a positive
probability since P
(
θmi(t) = θi
)
> (1− γθi) pθi . Thus each
agent i will eventually saturate its utility function and
converge to a steady-state ego network that remains fixed
for all t > Ti.
Now we upper bound the average utility function of
type-k agents. Recall that U tk =
1
|Vtk|
∑
j∈Vt
k
utj . Since for
each agent i we have αsθi ≥ α
d
θi
, then each individ-
ual agent maximizes its utility when linked to similar
type agents only, which corresponds to a utility of uti =
vθi
(
αsθiL
∗
θi
(0)
)
− c L∗θi(0). Thus, we have
U
∗
k =
1
|Vtk|
∑
j∈Vt
k
vk (α
s
kL
∗
k(0))− c L
∗
k(0)
= vk (α
s
kL
∗
k(0))− c L
∗
k(0).
The average utility of all agents in the network
U t is upper bounded by U
∗
t =
1
t
∑
j∈Vt u
t
j =
1
t
∑
k∈Θ
∑
j∈Vt
k
vk (α
s
kL
∗
k(0)) − c L
∗
k(0), which for a large
network converges to U
∗
, where U
∗
= limt→∞
1
t
∑
j∈Vt u
t
j ,
and
U
∗
= lim
t→∞
∑
k∈Θ
|Vtk|
t
(vk (α
s
kL
∗
k(0))− c L
∗
k(0))
=
∑
k∈Θ
pk (vk (α
s
kL
∗
k(0))− c L
∗
k(0)) .
Now we prove that this upper-bound is achieved if and
only if all types of agents are extremely homophilic. We start
by showing that if hl = 1, ∀l ∈ Θ, then limt→∞ U t = U
∗
.
If agents are extremely homophilic, then each agent con-
nects only to similar type agents, i.e. P
(
ati
∣∣θmi(t) = θi ) =
I{
θmi(t)=θi,Ni(t)<L
∗
θi
(0)
}. Since each agent meets a same-type
agent with a non-zero probability in every time step, and
will always form its ego network in a finite time (recall
Lemma 1), the utility achieved by each agent i is then given
by vθi
(
αsθiL
∗
θi
(0)
)
− c L∗θi(0), and limt→∞ U
t = U
∗
.
Now we prove the converse, and show that if
limt→∞ U
t = U
∗
, then hl = 1, ∀l ∈ Θ. If hl < 1 for exactly
one type of agents l ∈ Θ, then there is a fraction of type-
l agents that form at least one link with a different-type
agent, i.e. limt→∞
1
t
∣∣∣{j ∈ Vtl ∣∣∣Ndj (t) > 0}∣∣∣ > (1− pl), thus
limt→∞ U
t
l < U
∗
l , and thus limt→∞ U
t < U
∗
. Therefore, all
agents must be extremely homophilic for the optimal utility
to be achieved.
Finally, since when hl = 1, ∀l ∈ Θ, agents restrict
their links to same-type agents only, then there is no links
between different groups and the network will be discon-
nected with the number of components being at least equal
to the number of types, i.e. ω (Gt) ≥ |Θ|.
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APPENDIX F
PROOF OF THEOREM 3
We start by evaluating the popularity growth rate in a
tolerant society with fully non-opportunistic agents, i.e. a
society with hk = 0, γk = 0, ∀k ∈ Θ. Note that the expected
popularity of any agent i is given by
E
{
∆deg−i (t)
}
= E


t∑
j=i
∆deg−i (j)


=
t∑
j=i
E
{
∆deg−i (j)
}
, (F.1)
where the expectation is taken over all the realizations of
the graph process {Gt}
∞
t=1, thus using the the law of total
expectation, (F.1) can be written as
E
{
∆deg−i (j)
}
=
∑
Gj∈Gj
E
{
∆deg−i (j)
∣∣Gj}P (Gj) . (F.2)
In the following, we compute the term∑
Gj∈Gj E
{
∆deg−i (j)
∣∣Gj}P (Gj), and then compute
the summation in (F.1) in order to obtain the popularity
growth rate. First, note that from Theorem 1, we know that
in a tolerant society, each agent j stays L∗θj(0) time steps in
the ego network formation process almost surely. Thus, the
set of agents that can potentially link to agent i at any time
step t (which we denote as Φt) is given by
Φt =
{
t−max
l∈Θ
L∗l (0) + 1, t−max
l∈Θ
L∗l (0) + 2, . . ., t
}
.
That is, an agent’s popularity acquisition process in a toler-
ant and non-opportunisic society depends only on the types
of themaxl∈Θ L
∗
l (0)most recently born agents, and their ac-
tions in the most recent maxl∈Θ L
∗
l (0) time steps. The types
of such agents determine their levels of gregariousness, and
thus the possibility of each of them linking to agent i at time
t. Since agents find each others just by random matching,
we can then write (F.2) as shown in (F.3). Based on (F.3), the
expected number of links gained by agent i at time t is given
by (F.4).
In the following, we briefly explain the steps involved in
(F.4). First, (a) is the application of the law of total expec-
tation to the expected in-degree of an agent i by averaging
over all the possible types of the most recently born agents,
and the probability that such agents have linked to i in the
previous time steps. In (b) and (c), we rewrite the expression
in (a) by computing the average number of recently born
agents whomeet agent i and have not already been linked to
i untill the time step t−1. The expressions for the probability
that one of the recently born agents meet with agent i are
plugged in (d) and further simplified in (e). A Taylor series
approximation (1 − 1x)
a ≈ e−
a
x is used in (f)-(h), and the
asymptotic value of E
{
∆deg−i (t)
}
is provided in (i).
From (F.4), the expected number of links gained by
any agent i at time t in a large network boils down to
the simple expression E
{
∆deg−i (t)
}
= L¯t , where L¯ =
∑
m∈Θ pmL
∗
m(0). Consequently, the expected popularity of
agent i at time t is given by
E
{
deg−i (t)
}
= E


t∑
j=i
∆deg−i (j)


=
t∑
j=i
E
{
∆deg−i (j)
}
=
t∑
j=i
L¯
j
= L¯ (Ht −Hi−1)
≍ L¯ ((log(t)− ψ)− (log(i− 1)− ψ))
= L¯ log
(
t
i− 1
)
, (F.5)
where HN is the N
th harmonic number, and ψ is the Euler-
mascheroni constant. Thus, E
{
deg−i (t)
}
is O
(
L¯ log(t)
)
, and
the first part of the Theorem follows.
Next, we evaluate the popularity growth rate in a tol-
erant society with fully opportunistic agents, i.e. a society
with hk = 0, γk = 1, ∀k ∈ Θ. Similar to (F.1), we start
by evaluating
∑
Gt∈Gt E
{
∆deg−i (t)
∣∣Gt}P (Gt). Note that
the maximum number of agents forming links at any time
step is given by maxl∈Θ L
∗
l (0) (the birth dates of all such
agents belong to the setΦt). Since in an opportunistic society
the meeting process depends on the network structure, we
start by evaluating the term E
{
∆deg−i (t)
∣∣Gt} in (F.6). We
briefly explain the steps involved in (F.6) in the following.
In (a)-(b) we rewrite the law of total expectation by taking
the expected number of agents that will meet agent i given
that these agents have not yet saturated their utilities, and
have not linked with i before, and have become a follower
of follower for i in a previous time step. In (c) we further
simplify the expression by observing that the probability
that agent k meets agent i given that k is a follower of a
follower of i is simply given by 1Kk(t) . In (d) we get the
exact probability that agent t links to agent i, which is given
by 1t−1 , and the probability that agent t−1 links to agent i at
time t is given by
(
deg−
i
(t−1)
t−2
)∑
m∈Θ
pm
L∗m(0)
, i.e. k links to a
follower of i at time t−1, and then links to i at time t, which
happens with a probability of pmL∗m(0)
(i.e. the reciprocal of
the gregariousness of agent i’s follower averaged over its
random type distribution). The probability that the “older”
agents link to i at time t depend on the degrees of the
followers of i, which makes the problem intractable. Thus,
we lower bound the E
{
∆deg−i (t)
}
by assuming that agents
find agent i after more than two time steps only if they have
linked to one of its followers at their birth date. This leads to
the following approximation for the expected gained links
by agent i at time t
E
{
∆deg−i (t)
}
=
1 + bE
{
deg−i (t− 1)
}
t
,
where
b =
∑
w∈Θ
pw
L∗w(0)
.
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E
{
∆deg−i (t)
}
=
∑
Gt∈Gt
E
{
∆deg−i (t)
∣∣ {θv}v∈Φt , {At−1(v, i)}v∈Φt/{t}
}
P
(
{θv}v∈Φt ,
{
At−1(v, i)
}
v∈Φt/{t}
)
. (F.3)
E
{
∆deg−i (t)
} (a)
=
∑
Gt∈Gt
E
{
∆deg−i (t)
∣∣ {θv}v∈Φt , {At−1(v, i)}v∈Φt/{t}
}
P
(
{θv}v∈Φt ,
{
At−1(v, i)
}
v∈Φt/{t}
)
(b)
=
∑
k∈Φt
∑
θk∈Θ
pθk
(
P
(
mk(t) = i
∣∣∣k /∈ N−i,t−1, L∗θk(0) ≥ t− k + 1)P(k /∈ N−i,t−1, L∗θk(0) ≥ t− k + 1))
(c)
=
∑
k∈Φt
∑
θk∈Θ
pθk
(
I{
L∗
θk
(0)≥t−k+1
}P
(
mk(t) = i
∣∣∣k /∈ N−i,t−1)P(k /∈ N−i,t−1)
)
(d)
=
∑
k∈Φt
∑
θk∈Θ
pθk
(
I{
L∗
θk
(0)≥t−k+1
}
(
1
t− 1− (t− k)
) t−1∏
n=k
(
1−
1
n− 1− (n− k)
))
(e)
=
∑
k∈Φt

∑
θk∈Θ
pθkI
{
L∗
θk
(0)≥t−k+1
}

( 1
k − 1
)(
1−
1
k − 1
)t−k
(f)
≈
t∑
k=t−maxl∈Θ L∗l (0)+1

∑
θk∈Θ
pθkI
{
L∗
θk
(0)≥t−k+1
}

(e− t−kk−1
k − 1
)
(g)
=
(∑
θk∈Θ
pθkI
{
L∗
θk
(0)≥maxl∈Θ L∗l (0)
}
)
e
−
maxl∈Θ L
∗
l
(0)−1
t−maxl∈Θ L
∗
l
(0)
t−maxl∈Θ L∗l (0)
+ . . .+
(∑
θk∈Θ
pθkI
{
L∗
θk
(0)≥2
}
)
e−
2
t−3
t− 2
+
1
t− 1
(h)
=
maxl∈Θ L
∗
l (0)∑
w=1
(∑
θk∈Θ
pθkI
{
L∗
θk
(0)≥w
}
)
e−
w−1
t−w
t− w
(i)
≍
L¯
t
. (F.4)
Now assume a continuous-time approximation for the pop-
ularity growth process. Bote that since
E
{
∆deg−i (t)
}
= E
{
deg−i (t)
}
− E
{
deg−i (t− 1)
}
,
then we have that
∂E
{
deg−i (t)
}
∂t
≈ E
{
∆deg−i (t)
}
.
Thus, the popularity of each agent i is governed by the
following differential equation
∂E
{
deg−i (t)
}
∂t
=
1
t
(
1 + bE
{
deg−i (t)
})
.
This differential equation can be solved by dividing both
sides by
(
1 + bE
{
deg−i (t)
})
and integrating both sides as
follows∫
1(
1 + bE
{
deg−i (t)
})dE{deg−i (t)} =
∫
1
t
dt,
which reduces to
1
b
log
(
1 + bE
{
deg−i (t)
})
+ c1 = log(t) + c2,
and hence we have that
E
{
deg−i (t)
}
= c3t
b −
1
b
,
where c1, c2, and c3 are constants. The constant c3 can be
obtained from the initial conditions as follows. Note that
at t = i cannot receive any links since all agents are oppor-
tunistic and the set of followers of i is empty at its birth date.
Thus, deg−i (i) = 0, and consequently E
{
deg−i (t)
}
= 0,
which means that c3 =
1
ibb . Since the differential equation
above was solved by plugging in a lower bound on agent
i’s expected popularity at any time step, it follows that
E
{
deg−i (t)
}
≥
1
b
(
t
i
)b
−
1
b
, ∀t ≥ i,
which means that the popularity of every agent i grows at
least sublinearly in time, and the second part of the Theorem
follows.
APPENDIX G
PROOF OF COROLLARY 3
Following Definition 1, we say that preferential attachment
emerges if deg−i (t) ≥ deg
−
j (t) implies that deg
−
i (t) 
deg−j (t), ∀i, j ≤ t, t ∈ N. We know that in a tolerant society,
the maximum number of agents forming links at any time
step is maxl L
∗
l (0), and the birth dates of such agents are
given by the set Φt = {t, t− 1, . . ., t−maxl L∗l (0) + 1}. Fol-
lowing the analysis in Appendix F, the probability that agent
k ∈ Φt links to agent i at time t, which we denote as ptik, is
given by (G.1). It follows that∆deg−i (t) obeys a poisson bino-
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E
{
∆deg−i (t)
∣∣ deg−i (t− 1),deg−i (t− 2), . . .,deg−i (i)}
(a)
=
∑
k∈Φt
∑
θk∈Θ
pθk

P

mk(t) = i
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣k /∈ N
−
i,t−1, k ∈
⋃
j∈N−i,t−1
N−j,t−1,Kk(t), L
∗
θk
(0) ≥ t− k + 1


× P

k /∈ N−i,t−1, k ∈ ⋃
j∈N−
i,t−1
N−j,t−1,Kk(t), L
∗
θk
(0) ≥ t− k + 1




(b)
=
∑
k∈Φt
∑
θk∈Θ
pθk

I{L∗
θk
(0)≥t−k+1
}P

mk(t) = i
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣k /∈ N
−
i,t−1, k ∈
⋃
j∈N−i,t−1
N−j,t−1,Kk(t)


× P

k /∈ N−i,t−1, k ∈ ⋃
j∈N−
i,t−1
N−j,t−1,Kk(t)




(c)
=
∑
k∈Φt
∑
θk∈Θ
pθk

 I
{
L∗
θk
(0)≥t−k+1
}
Kk(t)
P

k /∈ N−i,t−1, k ∈ ⋃
j∈N−i,t−1
N−j,t−1,Kk(t)




(d)
=
1
t− 1
+
(
deg−i (t− 1)
t− 2
)(∑
n∈Θ
pnI{L∗n(0)≥2}
) ∑
m∈Θ
pm
L∗m(0)
+
t−2∑
k=t−maxl L∗l (0)+1
∑
θk∈Θ
pθk

 I{L∗θk (0)≥t−k+1}
Kk(t)
×
P

k /∈ N−i,t−1, k ∈ ⋃
j∈N−i,t−1
N−j,t−1,Kk(t)




(e)
≥
1
t− 1
+
(
deg−i (t− 1)
t− 2
) ∑
m∈Θ
pm
L∗m(0)
+
maxl L
∗
l (0)−1∑
v=2
(
deg−i (t− v)
t− v − 1
)(∑
n∈Θ
pnI{L∗n(0)≥v+1}
)
×

∑
z1∈Θ
∑
z2∈Θ
· · ·
∑
zv∈Θ
v∏
u=1
pzu
(
1−
1∑v−1
x=1L
∗
zx(0)
)
1∑v
x=1L
∗
zx(0)


(f)
≥
1
t− 1
+
deg−i (t− 1)
t− 2
∑
w∈Θ
pw
L∗w(0)
(g)
≈
1 +
(∑
w∈Θ
pw
L∗w(0)
)
deg−i (t− 1)
t
. (F.6)
E
{
∆deg−i (t)
} (a)
=
∑
Gt∈Gt
E
{
∆deg−i (t)
∣∣Gt} P (Gt)
(b)
=
∑
Gt∈Gt
1 +
(∑
w∈Θ
pw
L∗w(0)
)
deg−i (t− 1)
t
P
(
Gt
)
(c)
=
1 +
(∑
w∈Θ
pw
L∗w(0)
)∑
Gt∈Gt deg
−
i (t− 1)P (G
t)
t
(d)
=
1 +
(∑
w∈Θ
pw
L∗w(0)
)
E
{
deg−i (t− 1)
}
t
. (F.7)
mial distribution with a support n ∈ {0, 1, . . .,maxl L∗l (0)}.
The pmf of ∆deg−i (t) is given by
P
(
∆deg−i (t) = n
)
=
∑
A∈Stn
∏
q∈A
ptiq
∏
r∈Ac
(1 − ptir),
where Stn is the set of all size-n subsets of Φ
t. The CDF of
∆deg−i (t) is given by
P
(
∆deg−i (t) ≤ n
)
=
n∑
l=0
∑
A∈St
l
∏
q∈A
ptiq
∏
r∈Ac
(1 − ptir).
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ptik =
∑
θk∈Θ
pθk

P

mk(t) = i
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣k /∈ N
−
i,t−1, k ∈
⋃
j∈N−
i,t−1
N−j,t−1,Kk(t), L
∗
θk(0) ≥ t− k + 1



 (G.1)
It can be easily shown that
∂P
(
∆deg−
i
(t)≤n
)
∂ptiy
< 0, ∀y ∈
Φt. We know from (F.6) that if deg−i (t) ≥ deg
−
j (t),
then P
(
∆deg−i (t) ≤ n
)
≤ P
(
∆deg−j (t) ≤ n
)
, ∀n. Thus,
deg−i (t) ≥ deg
−
j (t) implies that ∆deg
−
i (t)  ∆deg
−
j (t).
APPENDIX H
PROOF OF COROLLARY 4
Note that for the two agents i and j with i < j, we can write
deg−i (t) as
deg−i (t) =
j−1∑
m=i
∆deg−i (m) +
t∑
v=j
∆deg−i (v),
whereas deg−j (t) can be written as
deg−i (t) =
t∑
l=j
∆deg−j (l).
Based on the derivations in Appendix F, it is easy to
see that both
∑t
l=j ∆deg
−
j (l) and
∑t
v=j ∆deg
−
i (v) fol-
low the same distribution, i.e. P
(∑t
l=j ∆deg
−
j (l) = n
)
=
P
(∑t
v=j ∆deg
−
i (v) = n
)
. Now we show that deg−i (t) 
deg−j (t). In order to prove that deg
−
i (t)  deg
−
j (t),
we need to show that P
(∑t
l=j ∆deg
−
j (l) ≤ n
)
≥
P
(∑t
v=i∆deg
−
i (v) ≤ n
)
, ∀n. This can be shown by observ-
ing that
P
(
t∑
v=i
∆deg−i (v) ≤ n
)
=
P

 j−1∑
m=i
∆deg−i (m) +
t∑
v=j
∆deg−i (v) ≤ n

 ,
which can be re-arranged as
P
(
t∑
v=i
∆deg−i (v) ≤ n
)
=
P

 t∑
v=j
∆deg−i (v) ≤ n−
j−1∑
m=i
∆deg−i (m)

 .
Since
∑j−1
m=i∆deg
−
i (m) > 0 almost surely, and since∑t
l=j ∆deg
−
j (l) and
∑t
v=j ∆deg
−
i (v) follow the same dis-
tribution, then it follows from the monotonicity of CDFs
that
P

 t∑
v=j
∆deg−i (v) ≤ n−
j−1∑
m=i
∆deg−i (m)

 ≤
P

 t∑
l=j
∆deg−j (l) ≤ n

 , ∀n,
thus deg−i (t)  deg
−
j (t).
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From (F.5), we know that
E
{
d1i (t)
}
= L¯ log
(
t
i− 1
)
,
whereas E
{
d2i (t)
}
is lower-bounded as follows
E
{
d2i (t)
}
≥
1
b
((
t
i
)b
− 1
)
.
Since E
{
d2i (t)
}
grows faster than E
{
d1i (t)
}
, we know that
E
{
d2i (t)
}
dominates E
{
d1i (t)
}
after a finite time T ∗. We can
obtain T ∗ by solving the following transcendental equation
for t
E
{
d1i (t)
}
= E
{
d2i (t)
}
.
An upper-bound on the solution can be obtained by solving
the following transcendental equation for t, in which we
replace E
{
d2i (t)
}
by its lower-bound
L¯ log
(
t
i− 1
)
=
1
b
((
t
i
)b
− 1
)
. (I.1)
Note that (I.1) can be put in the following form
tbL¯ =
(i − 1)bL¯
e
e(
t
i )
b
. (I.2)
A functional form for the solution to (I.2) can be obtained in
terms of the Lambert W functionW−1(.) [56] as follows
t∗ = i×
(
−L¯W−1
(
−1
L¯
e
−1
L¯
)) 1
b
. (I.3)
Thus, T ∗ ≤ t∗ and the Theorem is concluded.
APPENDIX J
PROOF OF THEOREM 4
Similar to the proof of Theorem 3, we start by evaluating the
popularity growth rate in an intolerant society with fully
non-opportunistic agents, i.e. a society with hk = 1, γk =
0, ∀k ∈ Θ. The expected popularity of any agent i can be
written as
E
{
deg−i (t)
}
=
t∑
j=i
E
{
∆deg−i (j)
}
, (J.1)
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E
{
∆deg−i (t)
}
=
∑
Gt∈Gt
E
{
∆deg−i (t)
∣∣ {θv}tv=1 , {At−1(v, i)}tv=1 , {deg+v (t)}tv=1
}
P
(
{θv}
t
v=1 ,
{
At−1(v, i)
}t
v=1
,
{
deg+v (t)
}t
v=1
)
.
(J.3)
E
{
∆deg−i (t)
} (a)
=
∑
Gt∈Gt
E
{
∆deg−i (t)
∣∣ {θv}tv=1 , {At−1(v, i)}tv=1 , {deg+v (t)}tv=1
}
P
(
{θv}
t
v=1 ,
{
At−1(v, i)
}t
v=1
,
{
deg+v (t)
}t
v=1
)
(b)
=
t∑
k=1
∑
θk∈Θ
pθk
(
P
(
At(k, i) = 1
∣∣∣k /∈ N−i,t−1,deg+k (t) < L∗θk(0))P(k /∈ N−i,t−1,deg+k (t) < L∗θk(0)))
(c)
=
t∑
k=1
(
P
(
mk(t) = i
∣∣∣k /∈ N−i,t−1,deg+k (t) < L∗θk(0), θk = θi )P(k /∈ N−i,t−1,deg+k (t) < L∗θk(0), θk = θi))
(d)
=
pθi
t− 1
t∑
k=1
P
(
k /∈ N−i,t−1,deg
+
k (t) < L
∗
θk(0)
)
(e)
=
pθi
t− 1
(
i−1∑
k=1
P
(
k /∈ N−i,t−1,deg
+
k (t) < L
∗
θk(0)
)
+
t∑
k=i+1
P
(
k /∈ N−i,t−1,deg
+
k (t) < L
∗
θk(0)
))
(f)
=
pθi
t− 1
(
i−1∑
k=1
(
1− I1−pθi
(
L∗θi(0), t− k − L
∗
θi(0) + 1
)) t∏
w=i
(
1−
1
w − 1
)
+
t∑
k=i+1
(
1− I1−pθi
(
L∗θi(0), t− k − L
∗
θi(0) + 1
)) t∏
w=k
(
1−
1
w − 1
))
(g)
≈
pθi
t− 1
(
i−1∑
k=1
(
1− I1−pθi
(
L∗θi(0), t− k − L
∗
θi(0) + 1
)) t∏
w=i
(
1−
1
w − 1
)
+
t∑
k=i+1
(
1− I1−pθi
(
L∗θi(0), t− k − L
∗
θi(0) + 1
))
e−
∑t
w=k
1
w−1
)
(h)
≍
pθi
t− 1
t∑
k=i+1
(
1− I1−pθi
(
L∗θi(0), t− k − L
∗
θi(0) + 1
))
e−
∑t
w=k
1
w−1
(i)
=
pθi
t− 1

 t∑
k=t−L∗
θi
(0)+1
e−
∑t
w=k
1
w−1 +
t−L∗θi (0)∑
k=i+1
(
1− I1−pθi
(
L∗θi(0), t− k − L
∗
θi(0) + 1
))
e−
∑t
w=k
1
w−1


(j)
≈
pθi
t− 1

L∗θi(0) +
t−L∗θi
(0)∑
k=i+1
(
1− I1−pθi
(
L∗θi(0), t− k − L
∗
θi(0) + 1
))
e−
∑t
w=k
1
w−1


(k)
≈
pθi
t− 1

L∗θi(0) +
t−L∗θi
(0)∑
k=i+1
(1− pθi)
k


(l)
≈
L∗θi(0)
t
. (J.4)
where the expectation is taken over all the realizations of
the graph process {Gt}
∞
t=1, thus using the the law of total
expectation, E
{
∆deg−i (t)
}
in (J.1) can be written as
E
{
∆deg−i (t)
}
=
∑
Gt∈Gt
E
{
∆deg−i (t)
∣∣Gt}P (Gt) . (J.2)
Unlike the case of tolerant societies, the number of agents
forming a link at any time step can be arbitrarily large, i.e.
since agents are homophilic, they may wait for an arbitrarily
large period to form any link since they are constrained to
linking to same-type agents only. Thus, (J.2) can be written
as shown in (J.3). The derivation of E
{
∆deg−i (t)
}
is given in
(J.4). In the following, we briefly explain the steps involved
in (J.4). (a) is an application of the law of total expectation,
and (b)-(c) are simplifications of (a) that is obtained by
observing that an agent k can link to i only if it has not yet
linked to it in a previous time step and its utility function is
not yet satisfied. (d) is obtained by observing that k can link
to i only if θi = θk. In (e) and (f) we compute the conditional
probabilities explicitly, and (g) is obtained by using a first-
order Taylor series approximation, which converges to (h)
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for an asymptotically large network. In the rest of the steps,
we compute an approximation for the summation in (h).
Note that the result in (l) can be obtained by a simple Mean-
field approximation: the expected EFT of a type-m agent is
L∗m(0)
pm
, and thus the expected number of type-m agents is
L∗m(0), thus the expected number of links gained by a type-
m agent at time t is
L∗m(0)
t .
Based on (J.4), the popularity of an agent i at time t is
given by
E
{
deg−i (t)
}
=
t∑
j=i
E
{
∆deg−i (j)
}
=
t∑
j=i
L∗θi(0)
j
= L∗θi(0) (Ht −Hi−1)
≍ L∗θi(0) log
(
t
i− 1
)
. (J.5)
Next, we evaluate the popularity growth rate in an
intolerant society with fully opportunistic agents, i.e. a
society with hk = 1, γk = 1, ∀k ∈ Θ. Similar to (J.4), we
start by evaluating
∑
Gt∈Gt E
{
∆deg−i (t)
∣∣Gt}P (Gt). Since
in an opportunistic society the meeting process depends
on the network structure, we start by evaluating the term
E
{
∆deg−i (t)
∣∣Gt} in (J.6). The steps involved in (J.6) are
similar to those in (J.4).
Following the same steps in Appendix F, it can be easily
shown that
E
{
deg−i (t)
}
≥
1
bθi
(
t
i
)bθi
−
1
bθi
,
where bk > bm if L
∗
k(0) > L
∗
m(0).
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For γm = γk = 0, we have that
E
{
deg−i (t)
}
= log
(
L∗k(0)
i− 1
)
,
and
E
{
deg−j (t)
}
= log
(
L∗m(0)
j − 1
)
.
Thus, if i < j, then E
{
deg−i (t)
}
≥ E
{
deg−j (t)
}
, ∀t ≥ i,
whereas if i > j, then E
{
deg−i (t)
}
≥ E
{
deg−j (t)
}
, ∀t ≥
T ∗, where
T ∗ =
(i− 1)
L∗
k
(0)
L∗
k
(0)−L∗m(0)
(j − 1)
L∗m(0)
L∗
k
(0)−L∗m(0)
.
The same conclusion can be reached for the case of
γm = γk = 1. The second part of the Corollary follows
from the fact that popularity grows logarithmically in non-
opportunistic societies, whereas it grows at least sublinearly
in time for opportunistic societies, thus there always exists
a finite time after which the expected popularity of an agent
in an opportunistic society exceeds that of an agent in a
non-opportunistic society.
APPENDIX L
PROOF OF THEOREM 5
We assume a mean-field approximation for the popularity
growth process and consider that an agent’s indegree is
deterministic and is given by the expected indegree of that
agent. In this case, the cdf of the popularity of type-k agents
at time t, denoted by F t,kd (d), can be computed as follows
F t,kd (d) = 1−
∣∣{i ≤ t ∣∣E{deg−i (t)} ≥ d, θi = k}∣∣
|Vtk|
= 1−
i∗(d)
t
, (L.1)
where i∗(d) corresponds to the agent’s birth date that solves
the equation E
{
deg−i (t)
}
= d.
Now we focus on the case where γm = γk = 0, and
L∗k(0) > L
∗
m(0). In this case, we have that
F t,kd (d) = 1− e
−d
L∗
k
(0) ,
whereas
F t,md (d) = 1− e
−d
L∗m(0) .
Thus, F t,md (d) ≥ F
t,k
d (d), ∀d. The same approach can be
used to prove the second part of the Theorem.
APPENDIX M
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We start by showing that if there exists one type of agents
k ∈ Θ for which hk < 1 and γk < 1, then the network is
connected almost surely. Assume that at any point of time,
say time step τ , the network has 2 disconnected components
C1 and C2, where Ci is the set of agents in component i.
We show that these two components will connect almost
surely as the network grows. Assume that Et12 is the event
that an agent of type k who is attached to component C1
meets a stranger who belongs to type C2 and links to it, and
Et21 is the event that an agent of type k who is attached
to component C2 meets a stranger who belongs to type C1
and links to it. It is clear that P (Et12 ∨E
t
21) > 0, ∀t > τ . For
instance, it is easy to show that P (Et12) > pk(1−γk)
|C1|
|C1|+|C2|
.
Thus, P (
∨∞
t=τ (E
t
12 ∨ E
t
21)) = 1, and any two disconnected
components in the network will eventually get connected
through a type-k agent.
The converse follows from the fact that if the network is
connected, then there exists cross-type links and we cannot
have hk = 1, ∀k ∈ Θ. Moreover, if there exists one type
of agents k ∈ Θ for which hk < 1 while all other types
are extremely homophilic, then we must have γk < 1 or
otherwise type-k agents will never meet strangers and will
restrict their links to followees of followees who belong to
the same network component, and the network will display
|Θ| − 1 disconnected components.
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